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"CONFEDERATE BONDS," "GENERAL CUSTER,"
AND THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
Jery W Markham*
The phenomenal growth' of derivative financial instruments2
has sparked a near revolution in finance.' These instruments take
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 "Only three years into the decade, the 1990s are already being dubbed the Dec-
ade of Derivatives." Tracy Corrigan, Moving on to Centre Stage, FIN. TIMES (Survey),
Oct. 20, 1993, at 1. "Derivative financial instruments make up one of the fastest grow-
ing financial markets in the world." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., lsT SEss., REPORT ON DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 15,
(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT]. "More
capital changes hands as a result of futures contracts than for any other reason. The
dollar value of the world's annual turnover in futures contracts is at least ten times
that of the combined annual turnover of the world's stock exchanges, and is grow-
ing." EDWARD J. SWAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 1
(1993). Financial derivatives traded in the over-the-counter market are valued at
more than $12 trillion. Steven Lipin, GAO Study Seeking Stricter Controls on Derivatives
Draws Industry Fire, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at B7. Derivatives are "[n]ow a $35
[t] rillion [m] arket." Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives
Losses Rise, Industry Fights To Avert Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al. This is
the face value of the instruments. The actual risk exposure to the firms dealing in
these instruments, however, is actually much less because of offsetting interests and
obligations. Id.
2 A derivative instrument has been defined as "any contract, the value of which
fluctuates according to the value of an underlying commodity or group of commodi-
ties." SWAN, supra note 1, at 2. Another report states that "a derivative transaction is a
contract. . . whose value depends on (or 'derives' from) the value of an underlying
asset, reference rate, or index." GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRIN-
CIPLES 2 (July 1993) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT].
3 A House committee minority report prepared for Representative James A.
Leach has stated that derivative instruments "allow end-users, such as banks and cor-
porations, to, among other things, manage interest rate risks, currency risks, liquidity
.... provide cost savings on debt issuance," and manage assets and liabilities in a
more efficient and cost-objective manner. HOUSE BANKING COMMITITEE MINORITY
STAFF, REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (PART 1) 3 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter LEACH
REPORT]. New accounting standards are encouraging the development of derivative
instruments because they require securities held for trading to be marked-to-market.
This subjects institutions holding those securities to the dangers of fluctuations in
interest rates for long term instruments. Laurie Morse, A Two-Pronged Development,
FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at II. Increases in exchange rate volatility and the
crisis in the European rate mechanisms have further encouraged derivatives trading
development. James Blitz, Currency Products, ERM Crises Quicken Activity, FIN. TIMES
(Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at IV.
The British Government has found derivative style instruments to be of benefit.
Margaret Thatcher's government used indexed gilt edged securities with a return that
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many forms and. come in literally hundreds of varieties.4 Some,
such as commodity futures and options, are heavily regulated when
they are traded on organized exchanges.5 Other derivatives, partic-
ularly those traded over-the-counter, are subject to little regula-
tion.6 Included on the list of unregulated derivatives are swap
was based on an inflation index. These bonds have been preceded by the so-called
"Granny" indexed bonds issued by the British Labour government and which were
index linked. The Granny indexed bonds were limited to people above retirement
age. NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM No. 11 114-17 (1993). Large investment flows
into Latin America in recent years have additionally fueled expansion of derivative
trading. Antonia Sharpe, Survey of Latin American Finance, FIN. TIMES, April 11, 1994,
at VIII. The World Bank has also endorsed the use of derivatives in a five billion
dollar program of structured securities and currencies. See generally Michael R. Sesit,
Australians Look to Go Global With Individual-Stock Futures, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1994, at
CI (new futures contracts are being offered on individual stocks); Of Votes and Volatil-
ity, How a GDP Derivative, Once Invented, Could Protect Your Salary, THE ECONOMIST, May
14, 1994, at 86 (wider use of derivatives advocated).
4 The Comptroller of the Currency has found that more than 1200 financial de-
rivative products are currently being offered. These include such things as "'harmful
warrants,' 'worthless warrants,' 'death-backed bonds,' 'limbos,' and 'heaven and hell
bonds .... '" Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulator Signals Move On Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3. See also Lee Berton, SEC Is Seeking Data on Firms'Derivative Risk,
WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at Cl. For a general discussion of over-the-counter deriva-
tives, see Forum, The Future of Derivatives, INsTrruTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 1);
Derivatives, Ever More Complex, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, section III; A GuIDE TO THE
DERIVATIVES MARKET (Joe Kolman ed., 1994). Over-the-counter derivatives include
swaps, options, inverse floaters, caps, floors, collars, swaptions, embedded options,
synthetic indexing, synthetic stocks, barrier options, best-of-two-options, down-and-
out options, floors, ceilings, deferred stop or deferred start options, lateral options,
look back options, performance options, and exploding options, among others.
Elayne Sheridan, FCMs Capitalize on OTC Business, FtrruaRs INDUSTRY, Nov./Dec. 1993,
at 26, 29. For a definition of some of these instruments, see Meaningful Expressions,
FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at XII; International Banking (Survey), THE ECONO-
MIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 3, 4; Jerry W. Markham and David J. Gilberg, Federal Regulation
of Bank Activities in the Commodities Markets, 39 Bus. LAw. 1719 (1984).
The development of derivative products continues apace. In March of 1994, La-
zard Freres and Credit Agricole of France announced ajoint venture to market deriv-
atives. Among the transactions proposed are swaps in which company A would
borrow money to acquire company B. Interest payments would be based on the prof-
its of company B, the acquired company. Another example involves an arrangement
in which company A held a stake in company B. Company A would receive payments
in the event that the value of the stock of company B went down. Conversely, if the
stock went up, the payments in such an amount would have to be made to the deriva-
tive joint venture. Saul Hansell, Lazard Finds Brawny Ally for Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1994, at D1, D9.
5 See generallyJerry W. Markham & Kyra K. Bergin, Customer Rights Under the Com-
modity Exchange Act, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1299 (1984); Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity
Exchange Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977 (1991). New innova-
tions also continue on the regulated markets. See, e.g., Michael R. Sesit, New Derivative
for Wall Street: Amex Lists Hong Kong Options, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1994, at C1.
6 One Report noted:
It is commonly said that the market in over-the-counter derivatives is
unregulated. Compared to the exchange-period derivative market, this
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transactions.7 The swaps market alone is equal in size to the regu-
lated markets with which it competes.' The lack of regulation over
such a large financial market and the losses suffered by some large
firms in recent months have raised concerns that regulation may
be needed.9 Numerous private and governmental studies have sug-
is true. The futures and options exchanges operate under the scrutiny
of a regulatory agency-the CFTC and the SEC- with broad authority
to monitor transactions, to require registration and financial disclosure
of market position, to establish and enforce rules of conduct and finan-
cial standards, and to intervene directly in the marketplace, if need be,
to maintain fair and orderly trading. There is no such overarching reg-
ulatory structure in the over-the-counter market.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 (footnote omitted).
The international currency markets, which often involve derivative transactions and
which are the largest and most active financial markets in the world, are also largely
unregulated. Id. at 12. The daily turnover in that market is estimated to be approxi-
mately $1 trillion. Foreign Exchange Unsettling, THE ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 88.
7 Swap transactions generally involve an exchange of cash flows, as, for example,
where one party swaps a fixed interest rate payment obligation for a floating rate or
one currency for another. The parties do not exchange the underlying loan or pay-
ment obligation. Rather, they swap the difference in the payments they are obligated
to make. See generally Schulyer K. Henderson, An Analysis of Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 497 (1986); Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps; The Mod-
ern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of the Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 333 (1989); Lauren S. Klett, Comment, Oil-Price Swaps: Should These Inno-
vative Financial Instruments be Subject to Regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 DICK. L. REv. 367 (1989); Mark D.
Young and William L. Stein, Swap Transactions Under The Commodity Exchange Act: Is
Congressional Action needed? 76 GEO. L. REv. 1917 (1988).
Innovations in swaps continues. Airlines, for example, have been using swap
transactions in jet fuel by using fixed and floating rate price swaps in order to reduce
their jet fuel bills, which constitute a substantial percentage of their operating costs.
Deborah Hargeaves, Commodity Products, Cutting Raw Material Risks, FIN. TIMES (Sur-
vey), Oct. 20, 1993, at V. Even governments find swap transactions useful. See, e.g.,
Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., US Treasury, FED Create Facility to Support Peso, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 1994, at A4 (United States government establishes a swap facility to support the
Mexican peso after the assassination of their country's leading presidential
candidate).
8 The notional amount of the swaps market has been estimated to be $4 trillion at
the end of 1991. William T. Maitland &Jerry W. Markham, CFTC Rules to Provide Legal
Certainty for OTC Products, FUTuREs INDUSTRY MAG., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 20, 22. See also
Papering Over the Cracks, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD DIRECTORv & REVIEW, 1994, at 35.
9 See, e.g., Derivatives, The Beauty in the Beast, THE ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 21;
International Banking (Survey), THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 3, 40; Steven Lipin &
Anita Raghavan, GAO to Join Hot Debate on Derivatives, WALL ST.J., May 18, 1994, at CI;
George Melloan, Whitewater, Derivatives and the Urge to Regulate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14,
1994, at A15. A warning cry was sounded by the President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York in January of 1992. He stated that "the growth and complexity of
all types of balance sheet activities and the nature of the credit, price equivalent which
they entail should give us all cause for concern." Kevin Muehring, Who Do You Trust,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1992, at 73.
Regulators had begun to downplay fears over risk from derivatives before the
interest rate jumps in the first quarter of 1994, but concern remained that a
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gested improvements in balance sheet disclosures and some addi-
tional regulatory monitoring. Few of these reports advocate any
stringent regulatory controls or even a unified regulatory ap-
proach. 10 Yet, all seem to recognize that these instruments can
pose a serious threat to the world's financial systems." This article
will explore the growth and development of unregulated over-the-
"meltdown" could occur. Saul Hansell, Regulators Mute TheirFears OverDervatives, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 28, 1994, at D5 [hereinafter Hansell, Regulators Mute]. After a number of
losses occurred in derivatives, Congressional hearings were held. See, e.g., Saul Han-
sell, House Bill on Derivatives Introduced, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at ClI [hereinafter
Hansell, House Bill]; Saul Hansell, Derivatives Get a Key Supporter, N.Y. TMES, May 26,
1994, at CI [hereinafter Hansell, Key Supporter]; Saul Hansell, Panel Is Told Derivatives
Are No Cause for Alarm, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at DI [hereinafter Hansell, Panel];
Kenneth H. Bacon & Greg Hitt, Derivatives Face New Regulation From Congress, WALL ST.
J., May 11, 1994, at A4. The Chairman of the House Banking Committee set hearings
on derivatives in order to see if speculators were using derivatives to "engage in casino
like gambling activities." Lyle Crowley, George Soros, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 3, 1994, at
26, 29.
One Congressman stated that:
[T] he multitrillion dollar derivatives activities of the 10 largest American
commercial banks alone amount to double the annual GNP of the
United States which, in turn, is more money than all the money in the
world. If this doesn't define a pyramidal house of cards - particularly in
the event of a market shock sparked abroad by warmongers or at home
by private sector speculators or public pandering protectionists - what
does?
140 CONG. REc. H73-01 (1994) (remarks of Rep. Leach). Another Congressman was
even more colorful:
The threat is not from foreign competition, or Government deficits
or regulation. It is from Wall Street, and a new form of sophisticated
financial bingo called derivatives. Even Fortune magazine-hardly a
carping business critic-is warning that derivatives could swamp our
economy in a sea of red ink.
Fortune estimates the new derivatives game at some $16 trillion,
which is more than twice our Nation's total economic output. A single
default, the magazine said, could ignite a chain reaction that runs ram-
pant through the financial markets. "Inevitably, that would put deposit
insurance funds, and the taxpayers behind it, at risk."
That is a risk that Congress must not permit. Already the taxpayers of
this country are footing the bill for the $500 billion bailout of the sav-
ings and loan industry. A gang of financial high-fliers tried to get rich
quick on junk bonds and inflated real estate loans, and the taxpayers
had to clean up the mess. Congress learned a lesson, or should have, at
least.
140 CONG. REC. S5828-04, S5837 (1994) (remarks of Rep. Dorgan). The FoR-UNE
magazine article referred to by Congressman Dorgan is CarolJ. Loomis, The Risk That
Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 40. See generally Flexible Options Play Blamed
For Dow Rally, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at 21.
10 These reports are discussed infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
11 The LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, was the most aggressive of the reports. It
made thirty recommendations on improvements needed in the regulation of these
instruments. Id.
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counter derivative financial instruments, and it will suggest a meth-
odology for imposing a regulatory system over these still untested
instruments.
The first part of this article explores the history and back-
ground of derivative instruments, and it reviews the considerations
that led Congress to regulate many forms of these products. The
second part of the article turns to the growth of the new unregu-
lated financial instruments and describes some of the regulatory
concerns they have raised. The article then focuses on the regula-
tory approaches that have been considered to date, some of which
are as complicated as the instruments they seek to regulate. Fi-
nally, the article proposes a regulatory program that will guard
against undue exposure from derivative transactions without un-
duly restricting the growth and operation of this very important
financial market.
I. THE ORIGIN OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
Historians have traced transactions in derivative instruments
to 2000 B.C.12 Yet, in the United States, futures style contracts were
slow to develop."i The State of Massachusetts Bay did issue some
derivative instruments that appear to contain a crude form of cost
of living index. One such instrument was a two year note for three
hundred seventy pounds at six percent to be paid in currency "in a
greater or less Sum, according as Five Bushels of CORN for, Sixty-
12 This trading occurred on Bahrain Island. FUTUREs INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE FuTuREs MARKETS 2 (1984). EdwardJ. Swan at the University
of London has also discovered that commodity contracts with elements of future de-
livery were traded nearly four thousand years ago in ancient Mesopotamia. SwAN,
supra note 1, at 2. The precursor of modem exchanges and current regulations has
also been traced by Mr. Swan to the 12th century markets of Venice. Id. at 48-49. Mr.
Swan also found futures contracts as early as 1275 in England. SWAN, supra note 1, at
62.
Another article states that: "Regulated commodity markets existed in China,
Egypt, Arabia and India as early as 1200 B.C. However, modem day exchanges dealing
in commodity futures can more readily be traced to the medieval trade fairs of
Twelfth Century Europe." EdJones & John F. Cook, II, The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 457, 458 (1975).
Interestingly, the Greek and Roman civilizations seemed to have had an aversion
to futures contracts. SwAN, supra note 1, at 26-29. Nevertheless, Roman law did form
the basis for the legal recognition of these contracts. Id. at 30-33. Commodity futures
trading was occurring in Amsterdam by the 1600s. Id. Futures trading in rice "tickets"
was also occurring in Japan during the eighteenth century. CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 2 (1982).
13 Talleyrand was speculating in futures contracts as early as 1790, when he was in
exile in America. SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
868 (1989).
1994]
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eight Pounds and four-seventh Parts of a Pound. of BEEF, Ten
Pounds of SHEEPS WOOL, and Sixteen Pounds of SOLE
LEATHER shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred and
Thirty Pounds current Money, at the then current Prices of said Arti-
cles."" Nevertheless, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth
century that a fully functioning futures market was established in
Chicago.15 The bulk of the trading in futures contracts occurred
14 The note stated more fully that Massachusetts would pay:
the Sum of Three hundred seventy Pounds with Interest at Six per Cent,
per Annum: Both Principal and Interest to be paid in the then current
Money of said State, in a greater or less Sum, according as Five Bushels
of CORN, Sixty-eight Pounds and four-seventh Parts of a Pound of
BEEF, Ten Pounds of SHEEPS WOOL, and Sixteen Pounds of SOLE
LEATHER shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred and Thirty
Pounds current Money, at the then current Prices of said Articles-This
Sum being Thirty-two Times and an Half what the same Quantities of
the same Articles would cost at the Prices affixed to them in a Law of
this State made in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred
and Seventy-seven, intitled, "An Act to prevent Monopoly and Oppression."
The current prices of said Articles, and the consequent Value of every
Pound of the Sum herein promised, to be determined agreable to a
LAW of this State, intitled, "An ACT to provide for the Security and
Payment of the Balances that may appear to be due by Virtue of a Reso-
lution of the General Assembly of the Sixth of February One Thousand
Seven Hundred and Seventy-nine, to this State's Quota of the CONTI-
NENTAL ARMY, agreeable to the Recommendation of CONGRESS,
and for supplying the Treasury with a Sum of Money for that Purpose."
WILLIAM G. ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 135 (1983). These notes were issued to pay Massachusetts troops and
were the result of runaway inflation. Id. at 24. The United States government en-
tered into a loan arrangement in 1777 with the Famers General in France pursuant to
which the United States borrowed livres tournois and repaid those funds in tobacco.
Id. at 4. Virginia also issued quartermaster general's certificates that were payable in
specie or tobacco as adjusted for depreciation. Id. at 95, 168.
One of America's first financial scandals involved futures trading in securities.
William Duer, a prominent financier and Revolutionary War figure, was bankrupted
in 1792 after he engaged in massive speculations in the debt of the United States and
stock of the Bank of the United States and the Bank of New York. He and an accom-
plice, Alexander Macomb, entered into contracts for the future delivery of those se-
curities, which triggered a speculative frenzy. The speculation eventually failed,
resulting in America's first financial panic. Duer was jailed, and he died in debtor's
prison. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 278-79 (1993).
15 Modern futures trading stems from the grain marketing problems that occurred
in the midwest during the early 1800s. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRAD-
ING MANuAL 3-4 (1982). Prior to the development of futures trading, the Chicago
markets were flooded with grain at harvest time, and prices would drop to levels be-
low production costs. This devastated the farmers, and grain was left to rot in the
streets. Later, prices would skyrocket as surpluses were consumed. WILLIAM CRONON,
NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 123-25 (1991). To even out
this boom and bust cycle, so-called "forward" contracts were developed in which grain
was sold for delivery at a future date. These were quite similar to the "to arrive"
contracts that had been previously used in England, and which involved goods that
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initially on the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago. 6
The futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade
was a true derivative product. The futures contract's price and
function was based upon the value of another item-usually an ag-
ricultural commodity. These were not, however, the only derivative
instruments that existed in the United States at the middle of the
nineteenth century. In fact, the Civil War saw the development of
a derivative instrument whose complexity and financial elegance
matches anything that exists today on Wall Street. This was the so-
called Erlanger bond that was issued in Europe by Emile Erlanger
& Cie. and J. Henry Schroder & Co. for the Confederate States of
America.
The Erlanger bond was a tri-valued derivative instrument.
One such bond provided for payment at maturity of 100 pounds
sterling, 2500 French francs, or 4000 pounds of cotton, at the pur-
chaser's option. These bonds also came in tri-value denominations
of 500 pounds sterling, 1250 French francs, or 20,000 pounds of
cotton.
1 7
were being shipped. The goods could be sold even while they were afloat through the
use of negotiable bills of lading. Title was passed, but the goods arrived at a later
date. SwAN, supra note 1, at 92.
The forward contract allowed farmers and middlemen to develop storage facili-
ties because the grain no longer needed to be brought to market at harvest time.
Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Exchanges and the Privatization
of the Agricultural Sector in the Commonwealth of Independent States-Needed Steps in Creat-
inga Market Economy, 55 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 119, 135 (1992); CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANuAL 3-4 (1982);Jones & Cook, supra note 12, at 459.
By the close of the Civil War, forward contracts had evolved into what we now
know as futures contracts. This occurred when the terms of the contracts were stan-
dardized, with the grade of the commodity and delivery date becoming uniform. The
only item negotiated was price. With contract uniformity, traders could offset posi-
tions and could more easily speculate in the prices of commodities. 2 FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 107-10 (1920). This allowed the develop-
ment of our modern grain distribution system, which permits producers and users of
commodities to hedge against price changes. Futures contracts also perform a price
discovery function. Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining
the Offense, 56 FoRDHAM L. REv. 345, 349-52 (1987); Note, Federal Regulation of Commod-
ity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 825-30 (1951).
16 Abuses on the Board of Trade soon arose, and this had led to a legacy of con-
cern with the regulation of these instruments. It was said that, by the late 1860s, there
was a corner a month on that exchange. There was also concern that traders were
driving commodity prices down below production cost levels. This, in part, spurred
the populist movement in the United States during the late 1800s. Jerry W. Markham,
Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices -The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG.
281, 288-92 (1991).
17 The face of the Erlanger Bond stated, in part, that:
The Holder of the Bond .. . will have the option of converting the
same at its nominal amount into Cotton, at the rate of sixpence sterling
per pound - say 4,000 lbs. of Cotton in exchange for a Bond of 100
1994]
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The Erlanger bond, in effect, allowed a purchaser to speculate
on the price relationships among pounds sterling, French francs
and the price of cotton. 18 The "play" was that the purchaser would
receive the benefits of the commodity that exceeded the value of
their two counterparts. The purchaser was also speculating on the
success of the Confederacy, as the option could not be exercised
until six months after the conclusion of a peace treaty to end the
Civil War.19
Still another Confederate bond provided for the Treasury of
the Confederate States to pay principal and interest in either cash
or cotton.20 Interest coupons were attached to these bonds for pay-
ment in Confederate dollars or New Orleans Middling Grade Cot-
ton. Here, however, the derivative function worked against the
purchaser because the Confederate States could choose to pay the
lesser of the two valued items. Perhaps evidencing the dangers of
derivative instruments, the default risk on these cotton bonds
proved to be quite high.
Trading in "privileges," "puts and calls," and "price differ-
ences" also accompanied the speculation aroused by the Civil War.
Traders in Chicago, for example, used privileges in their grain
trading. For a fee, the purchaser was given the "privilege" or op-
tion to buy or sell grain at a specified price. In 1865, the Board of
Trade prohibited such transactions because they were viewed to be
gambling contracts. That bar was ineffective in stopping such trad-
ing, as were later efforts by the exchange, including one investiga-
[pounds] - at any time not later than six months after the ratification of a
Treaty of Peace between the present belligerents. Notice of the inten-
tion of converting Bonds into Cotton to be given to the representatives
of the Government in Paris or London, and sixty days after such notice
the Cotton will be delivered, if peace, at the ports of Charleston, Savan-
nah, Mobile, or New Orleans; if war, at a point in the interior within 10
miles of a railroad or stream navigable to the ocean .... The quality of
the Cotton to be the standard of New Orleans middling. If any Cotton is
of superior or inferior quality, the difference in value shall be settled by
two Brokers, one to be appointed by the Government, the other by the
Bondholder: whenever these two Brokers cannot agree on the value, an
Umpire is to be chosen, whose decision shall be final.
7 Percent Cotton Loan Confederate States of America, COLLECTOR'S CATALOGUE No. C-1 18
(Author's Copy).
18 See Tim W. Ferguson, Bank On It: Upheaval Breeds Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Apr.,
26, 1994, at A23.
19 Shelby Foote notes that this "transaction, though ostensibly a loan, was in fact
little more than a scheme for large-scale speculation in cotton." 2 SHELBY FooTx, THE
CIVL WAR, A NARRATIVE, FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN 156 (1963).
20 Confederate States of America, Loan Authorized by Act of Congress Aftproved April 30,
1863, COLLECTORS CATALOGUE No. C-138 (Author's copy).
[Vol. 25:1
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tion that involved a round-up of members and the use of private
detectives. It was reported that the investigation had implicated
half the members of the Board of Trade.2 1
Difference trading on price changes also became common-
place in the over-the-counter market. The states attempted to stop
this trading through legislation that prohibited such contracts or
made them unenforceable as gambling contracts. 22 Still, differ-
ence trading was able to spread to the oil markets, including the
Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange in New York. Specu-
lative transactions on that exchange exceeded those in railroad
stocks until its operations were strangled by the Standard Oil
Trust. 23
Difference trading also occurred in the securities markets. A
speculator could "place a wager on a stock, in much the same way
as he might bet on a prize fight or a horse race. 2 a In one famous
case, Justh v. Holliday,25 a broker was denied enforcement of a note
against a decedent's estate because the note had been given to
cover losses from betting on price differences in stocks. 26 The sur-
reptitious nature of the trading, and the fact that the decedent did
not have the wherewithal to actually buy the stocks purportedly be-
ing traded, convinced the court that these were illegal gambling
contracts. The decedent won that skirmish but lost a much bigger
battle, and his life, only a few months after issuing this note. He
was General George Armstrong Custer.27
21 JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REG-
ULATION 8-9 (1987);JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 1859-1905 41-44
(1979).
22 Edward J. Swan, United States: The Rise & Decline of Futures Trading in America,
1994 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REV. 3, 12. See generally THoMAs DEWEY, A TREATISE ON
CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DELIVERY AND COMMERCIAL WAGERS INCLUDING "OPTIONS,"
"FUTURES," AND "SHORT SALES" (1886) [hereinafter DEWEY, A TREATISE]; THOMAS
DEWEY, LEGISLATION AGAINST SPECULATION AND GAMBLING IN THE FORMS OF TRADE
(1905) [hereinafter DEWEY, LEGISLATION] ;JOHN Dos PASSOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCK-EXCHANGES 409-55 (1882).
23 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 33-34,
53 (1991).
24 ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE 67 (1970).
25 13 D.C. (2 Mackay) 346 (1883).
26 See generally Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39
S.C. L. REv. 415, 452 n.125 (1988).
27 See generally EVAN S. CONNELL, THE SON OF THE MORNING STAR, CUSTER AND THE
LrIrLE BIG HORN (1984).
Betting on price differences on commodity prices had a revival in the securities
markets in the 1980s. Large advertisements were placed in the FIN. TIMES in London
by bookmakers that sought punters willing to gamble on commodity price changes:
With us, instead of buying or selling commodity futures direct, you sim-
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Other exotica were sold to the public such as "puts," "calls,"
and "straddles."28 In 1880, a New York court reviewed a case where
"a lady living in the country, ventured upon a speculation in stocks,
and lost her money. "29 In this transaction, the parties agreed to a
sixty day straddle in which the plaintiff was given the option to buy
or sell 100 shares of stock at a specified price. The defendant also
agreed to guarantee that there would be a minimum fluctuation in
the stock price of eight percent. If not, the defendant agreed to
return its commissions and the cost of the contract to the plain-
tiff.3" The plaintiff was allowed to recover despite the broker's
ply make a wager that the particular commodity you are interested in
will move either up or down in price.
I.G. index runs book in all commodity, currency and interest rate futures
quoted on the London, New York and Chicago Exchanges.
Commodity Investment Without Tax, FIN. TIMES, London, Mar. 2, 1982, at 20.
One Congressman has also charged that:
Derivatives are essentially a form of bet. Investors stake a position
that interest rates, or the dollar, or commodities or whatever, will rise
or fall. Up to a point, this is simply a form of hedging risk. Banks and
corporations have hedged in this manner for many years....
But Wall Street passed the point of innocuous risk-protection long
ago. Far from hedging risk, derivatives today have become a form of
risk. Some nations define them as gambling, which is what they are. In
the words of Henry Kaufman, the investment advisor, they mean that
"more credit is available to people who may have no business getting it."
Derivatives are the latest episode in a daisy chain of financial mis-
management, in which the bankers and financiers of this Nation have
tried to cover their bad investments with worse ones.
140 CONG. REc. S5828-04, S5837 (1994) (statement of Rep. Dorgan).
28 Straddles were also known as "spread-eagles." Dos PASSOS, supra note 22, at 445.
29 Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92, 95 (1880), noted in Dos PAssos, supra note 22,
at 171. The investor had been induced to invest as a result of the defendant's printed
circular that "[o]f course ... point out an easy and rapid road to wealth for any one
who is careful in his choice of a broker ... " Id. at 95.
30 The court stated that:
The plaintiff bought, through the agency of defendant, a stock option
or privilege, known in the language of brokers as a 'straddle.' The
word, if not elegant, is at least expressive. It means the double privilege
of a 'put' and 'call;' and secures to the holder the right to demand of
the seller at a certain price within a certain time a certain number of
shares of specified stock, or require him to take, at the same price
within the same time, the same shares of stock.... The value of a 'strad-
dle,' it is proven, depends upon the fluctuations of the stock selected.
The wider the range of these fluctuations, whether up or down, the
greater the amount which may be realized; and of course the longer the
option continues the greater the chance of such fluctuations during the
period.
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claim that it was an illegal gambling contract.31
Linked to difference trading and other such speculation were
the so-called "bucket shops."32 These operations did not actually
execute customer orders on an organized exchange. Instead, they
simply took the customer's funds as a bet on future price changes.
If the customer was wrong in his or her prediction of the direction
of the price, the bucket shop operator would keep the customer's
funds. If the customer won the bet, the bucket shop operator was
supposed to pay the customer the winnings. Often in such cases,
however, the bucket shop operators would simply disappear when
the market moved adverse to their betting positions.3' Neverthe-
31 Id. at 100. For other early derivative transaction cases, see, e.g., Coopers v. Neil,
13 Week. Notes 128 (1882), noted in Dos PAssos, supra note 22, at 421 (trading in
price differences on stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange); Bigelow v. Bene-
dict, 70 N.Y. 202 (1877) (put option for gold coins); Pixley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351
(1875) (privilege trading in wheat); Kirkpatrick & Lyons v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155 (1872)
(call option for "good green merchantable crude petroleum"); Lehman v. Strass-
berger, 15 Fed Cas. 254, 2 Woods 554 (N.D. Ala. 1875) (trading in cotton differences
by Lehman Brothers); Marshall v. Thruston, noted in 10 Cent. L.J 242 (Tenn. 1880)
(speculations in future prices of Tennessee State Bonds); In re Chandler, noted in 13
American L. Reg. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1874) (put options in oats); Cassard v. Hinmann, 14
N.Y. 84 (N.Y. 1856) (difference trading in pork); Grisewood v. Bain, 20 Eng. L. & Eq.
Rep. 290 (1852) (difference trading in railroad shares in London).
32 The Supreme Court has defined a bucket shop as:
an establishment, nominally for the transaction of a stock exchange
business, or business of similar character, but really for the registration
of bets, or wagers, usually for small accounts, on the rise or fall of the
prices of stock, grain, oil, etc. There being no transfer or delivery of the
stock or commodities nominally dealt in.
Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536 (1906). See also United States v. Sand-
ers, 696 F. Supp. 327, 330 (N.D. I1. 1988).
One author states, however, that the origin of the term bucket shop is uncertain:
[it] was first used in the late [18]70s, but it is very evident that it was
coined in London as many as fifty years ago, when it had absolutely no
reference to any species of speculation or gambling. It appears that
beer swillers from the East Side (London) went from street to street
with a bucket, draining every keg they came across and picking up cast-
off cigar butts. Arriving at a den, they gathered for social amusement
around a table and passed the bucket as a loving cup, each taking a
"pull" as it came his way. In the interval there were smoking and rough
jokes. The den soon came to be called a bucketshop. Later on the term
was applied, both in England and the United States, as a by-word of
reproach, to small places where grain and stock deals were
counterfeited.
JOHN HILL, GOLD BRiCKs OF SPECULATION 39 (1904). For a similar description, see
SOBEL, supra note 24, at 62.
33 One author has noted that a bucket shop was:
[A]n establishment where orders are taken, but are not placed. Mere
bookkeeping entries may or may not be made, and the practical effect
in the customers' attempt to place orders is that he simply bets his buck-
eting broker that a stock will rise or fall. The broker takes the opposite
1994]
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less, the bucket shops flourished, first in the Midwest and later in
New York,34 where the "Consolidated Exchange, the second largest
exchange in New York City and at one time the most powerful rival
of the New York Stock Exchange, came to be regarded as a den of
bucketeers." 35
The New York Stock Exchange acted to stop the bucket shops
from dealing in its stocks by restricting access to its stock quota-
tions.3 6 The State of Illinois took more forceful action. In 1896,
281 persons were indicted under an Illinois anti-bucket shop act.3 7
In 1900, two well known members of the Chicago Board of Trade
were indicted for bucket shop activities by a federal grand jury, and
federal prosecutions of bucket shops were conducted on a national
basis in 1909.38 For the most part, however, these and other efforts
to stop the bucket shops, often by treating such trading as prohib-
ited gambling, were unsuccessful.3 9
side of the bet.... [I]f the stock has gone down after he has given the
order to buy, the 'bucket shop' can without difficulty and with profit
buy the stock at the then lower market price and deliver the stock, or
the bucket shop can merely pay the customer. But if after a customer's
order to buy the stock has gone up, and the customer decides to secure
his profits, the 'bucket shop' then would either be unable to pay the
customer what he had paid it or it would have to go in the market and
buy it at a loss (that is at a higher price). There would be no funds for
this unless the 'bucket shop' had unlimited resources, (which they
never have) and the only opportunity the customer has to get his money
back, would arise from the fact that the particular broker's customers
whose accounts were larger in amount, had been on the other side of
the market, that is to say, the customers had been selling.
I WILLIAM HARMAN BLACK, THE LAW OF STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK BROKERS & CUSTOM-
ERS 136 (1940). See generally ANN FABIAN, CARD SHAREs, DREAM BOOKS, & BUCKET
SHOPS: GAMBLING IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 121-28 (1920); 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT
ON THE GRAIN TRADE 329 (1924); Note, supra note 15.
34 SOBEL, supra note 24, at 61.
35 M. Van Smith, The Commodity Futures Commission and the Return of the Bucketeers: A
Lesson in Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D. L. REv. 7, 13 n.26 (1981).
36 W.C. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 149 (1913). The New
York Stock Exchange for many years afterward prohibited its members from dealing
with anyone on the Consolidated Exchange and all communications with it were pro-
hibited. "The president of the New York Stock Exchange admitted that the purpose of
the rule is to drive the Consolidated out of business." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CON-
CENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d
Sess. 37 (1913).
37 HILL, supra note 32, at 75 (1904). Bucket shops were also subject to criminal
prosecution in New York. Dos PASSoS, supra note 22, at 687.
38 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 125, 128 (1920).
39 See generally DEWEY, A TREATISE, supra note 22; DEWEY, LEGISLATION, supra note
22; Dos PAssos, supra note 22, at 406-10; Telford Taylor, Trading in Commodity Fu-
tures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63 (1933).
1994] DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
Like the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of
Trade found that the bucket shops were threatening its opera-
tions. 40 The Board of Trade reacted strongly to that threat by em-
barking on an "antibucketshop crusade" 41 that sought to stop these
"monstrosities" 42 by cutting off their use of the Board of Trade's
price quotations, which the bucket shop operators needed to fuel
their operations.4" The Board of Trade's efforts were often frus-
trated by the courts44 until 1905, when the Supreme Court4 5 ruled
in the exchange's favor against the "Bucketshop King," C.C. Chris-
tie.46 That decision assured that the exchanges could control their
price quotations, and this struck a "deathblow" to the bucket
shops.47
The crusade against the bucket shops set the foundation for
the contract market monopoly that forms the linchpin of federal
regulation over commodity futures and contracts, which were the
40 The Chicago Open Board of Trade became a haven for the bucket shop opera-
tors. That exchange later became the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange, which was
later taken over by the Chicago Board of Trade. MARKHAM, supra note 21, at 9-10 &
n.14.
41 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 122 (1920).
42 Id. at 122, note 93.
43 DEwEY, A TREATISE, supra note 22, at 33-35.
44 See generally 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 122-27
(1920).
45 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 243 (1905).
46 HILL, supra note 32, at 68-73.
47 JULIUS B. BAER & GEORGE P. WOODRUFF, COMMODITY EXCHANGES 162 (1929).
In Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., the Supreme Court held that
futures contracts are binding contracts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as "mere
wagers." Christie, 198 U.S at 250. The Court stated that commodity futures contracts
create legally enforceable obligations regardless of whether they ultimately are liqui-
dated without physical delivery taking place. The Court noted that a "setoff" is, in
legal effect, a delivery. Id. at 248-50. Cf Peto v. Howell, 117 F.2d 249 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941). See also Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481 (1893); Hansen v.
Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1986); William P. Rogers &Jerry W. Markham, The Application of
West Germany Statutes to United Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Poli-
cies, 19 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 273, 280-83 (1987). Concerns are still raised, how-
ever, as to whether swaps and other derivatives can still be subject to the anti-
gambling statutes of some countries such as France, Canada, and Japan. Laurie
Morse, Legal Issues, Quest For Definitive Answers, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at
IV. China is also experiencing difficulties with bucket shops. Craig S. Smith, China
Moves To Rein In Futures Trading, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A12.
In Gatewood v. North Carolina, a conviction was upheld under a state statute that
sought to prevent dealing in futures by bucket shop operators. 203 U.S. 531, 543
(1906). In Fauntleroy v. Lum, however, the Supreme Court required the Mississippi
courts to enforce a Missouri judgment that was based on losses from commodity fu-
tures trading. 210 U.S. 230, 238 (1908). Such transactions were void in Mississippi as
gambling transactions, but not in Missouri.
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48predominant form of derivative trading until recent years. The
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 thus prohibits domestic futures
transactions that do not take place on a licensed contract market
such as the Chicago Board of Trade.49 Yet, it too did not prove to
be completely successful.
Futures contracts traded on commodities that were not listed
in the Commodity Exchange Act were not subject to the contract
market trading requirement. As a result, Congress had to periodi-
cally amend the Commodity Exchange Act to add new commodi-
ties to the regulated list in that statute.50 This amending
48 Markham, supra note 5, at 979-84.
49 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988). Abuses by the bucket shops and manipulative activities on
the exchanges led to calls for federal legislation. That legislation did not materialize
until 1921 even though there were over two hundred bills introduced between 1880
and 1920 that sought to regulate futures and options trading. Only one, the Hatch
Bill, came close to passage, and it failed after a Conference reconciliation could not
be approved before a Congressional recess. MARKHAM, supra note 21, at 10. Seegener-
ally Swan, supra note 22, at 13, 22-23; Margaret M. Wilson, The Attack on Options and
Futures, 1884-94 (1923) (unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of Kansas). The
Futures Trading Act was eventually enacted in 1921. 42 Stat. 187 (1921). That stat-
ute, however, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because it was im-
properly based on the taxation powers of the federal government. Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44, 71-72 (1922). This legislation was re-enacted in an almost identical form
under the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, but was renamed as
the Grain Futures Act. 42 Stat. 998 (1922). The new act was upheld by the Supreme
Court. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
The Grain Futures Act soon proved to be ineffective. Markham, supra note 16, at
301-12. The speculative abuses of the 1920s led to a simultaneous call for legislation
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt for both securities and commodities. HousE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, COMMODiTY EXCHANGE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935) (quoting letter from President Roosevelt to Chairman House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Mar. 26, 1934)). The commodity legis-
lation was assigned to the agricultural committees, thereby creating a rift in the regu-
latory structure between futures contracts and securities. Jerry W. Markham, Federal
Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 59, 70 (1991). The agricultural committees reported out legislation that became
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936-the legislation that governs the futures indus-
try even today. 7 U.S.C. §§1-26 (1988). That Act strengthened federal regulation
over the futures markets, but it carried forward the existing regulatory scheme of the
Grain Futures Act that required futures contracts to be traded on licensed ex-
changes-"contract markets." 7 U.S.C. §§6, 6h (1988).
50 As one Congressional report noted:
By... amendment of April 7, 1938, wool tops were added to the com-
modities subject to the act, and fats and oils, cottonseed, cottonseed
meal, peanuts, soybeans, and soybean meal were added October 9,
1940. Wool (as distinguished from wool tops) was added on August 28,
1954, and the act was made applicable to onions on July 26, 1955. Pub-
lic Law 85-839, approved August 28, 1958, prohibited futures trading in
onions, effective September 27, 1958, but did not remove onions from
the list of commodities covered by the Commodity Exchange Act. Effec-
tive June 18, 1968, the act was amended to include livestock and live-
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legislation, however, fell far behind the rapid expansion of com-
modities trading in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Consequently,
by the early 1970s, there were unregulated exchanges that were
trading futures contracts on numerous commodities including pre-
cious metals, currencies, and the so-called "world" commodities,
e.g., coffee, sugar, and cocoa.51
Another more serious flaw in the Commodity Exchange Act
involved its prohibition against commodity options trading, which
had been banned because of the many abuses associated with those
instruments.52 The same gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that
allowed some futures exchanges to operate in an unregulated envi-
ronment also allowed options trading on such commodities. This
gap was discovered by unscrupulous operators in the early 197 0s,
leading to millions of dollars in customer losses before they were
shut down by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
state securities commissions.5"
Congress reacted to these scandals and to the skyrocketing
commodity prices that were being blamed on futures speculators
by substantially amending the Commodity Exchange Act in 1974.
This new legislation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act (CFTCA) of 1974,54 created a new five member commission
stock products . . . . Public Law 90-418, approved July 23, 1968,
extended coverage of the act to frozen concentrated orange juice.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).
51 Id.
52 7 U.S.C. § 6c.
53 Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange
Act: A Call for Alternatives 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 15.
Harold Goldstein, a young entrepreneur in California, discovered this flaw in the
legislation. He began selling options on commodities that were not regulated under
the Commodity Exchange Act. Starting with an American Express card and $800, he
soon developed an empire. In fact, his firm became the second largest brokerage
firm in the United States within a short period of time. Jerry W. Markham & David J.
Gilberg, Stock And Commodity Options-Two Regulatory Approaches And Their Conflict, 47
ALB. L. REv. 741, 760-61 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Goldstein, however, overlooked
a serious flaw in his own operations. He did not hedge the options he was selling, and
when commodity prices began to explode in the 1970's, his firm became bankrupt.
Id.; see also Van Smith, supra note 35, at 8-9 (Goldstein's operations described as a
classic bucket shop operation). Although the issue of whether commodity options
were securities was uncertain, Goldstein was sued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and state securities commissions. Alan R. Bromberg, Commodities Law
and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemption, 1 J. CoRP. L. 217, 256-57 (1976). They
forced him and others who had copied his operation out of business or subjected
them to such constraints that they could not operate on a large scale basis. Robert C.
Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978 DuKE LJ. 1095, 1107 (1978). Those
actions, however, came too late. The failure of Goldstein's firm alone caused losses to
investors exceeding $80 million. Markham & Gilberg, supra, at 760-61.
54 Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
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similar in nature to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
this new commission was given expanded regulatory powers and
enforcement sanctions. 5 The new act subjected all commodities
of whatever kind to regulation under the Commodity Exchange
Act.5 6 The new Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), was also given plenary authority to regulate
commodity options."
Unfortunately, for Congress and many investors, a regulatory
gap concerning commodity options remained in the legislation
that had not been foreseen. This flaw should have been antici-
pated. In granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over all com-
modity options trading, Congress preempted the regulatory
proscriptions that had been imposed by the SEC and the state se-
curity commissions on the commodity option firms.58 Those firms
quickly sprang back to life. The results were some unbelievable
scandals and far reaching investor losses.59
The CFTC reacted by banning most commodity options, ex-
cept for "commercial" options and certain so-called "dealer" op-
tions.6° Later, it allowed commodity options trading on the
exchanges where the regulatory net for futures transactions would
be available.61
55 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 9.
56 7 U.S.C. § 2.
57 7 U.S.C. § 6c.
58 Id.
59 These firms began selling what they dubbed "London" options. These were op-
tions on commodities that were allegedly being sold on the London markets. These
firms advertised that such options were backed by clearinghouse guarantees so that
the Goldstein debacle would not be repeated. In fact, these guarantees did not ex-
tend to individual customers and some of the London exchanges had no such guaran-
tees, even though the default risk on those exchanges were slight. Markham &
Gilberg, supra note 53, at 763-64.
One firm marketing these London commodity options expanded as rapidly as
Goldstein's firm had in the pre-CFTC era. Its demise was equally spectacular. After
some initial unsuccessful challenges against this firm, the CFrC finally was able to
obtain an injunctive order against the fraudulent sales practices that were widespread
by its sales personnel. The injunction did not halt those practices, however, and the
owner of the firm was then arrested for contempt of court. It was then discovered
that he was an escaped felon from a NewJersey prison. The result was customer losses
in the millions from this firm and millions more were added by other fraudulent fly-
by-night operations. Id. at 763. See generally Lower, supra note 53.
60 These transactions involved commercial parties or firms that had sufficient capi-
tal that default concerns were obviated. MARKHAm, supra note 21, at 195-99.
61 Markham, supra note 53, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
This did not stop the CFTC's concern with over-the-counter derivative products.
Soon after the demise of commodity options trading, firms began offering what were
termed to be "forward" or "deferred delivery" contracts that were not subject to the
Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2. These were historically deemed to be
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The CF[C was understandably less enthusiastic toward the de-
velopment of further over-the-counter derivative instruments. The
agency was, however, given little breathing room after it finally put
a stop to the fraudulent commodity option operations and their
spin-offs. The CFTC faced battle on other fronts. The SEC, for
example, had begun almost immediately after the creation of the
CFTC to assault its exclusive jurisdiction that had been granted by
Congress in 1974.62 In addition, Congress sowed further problems
equivalent to cash transactions, but the fly-by-night operators converted them into the
equivalent of options. The CFTC responded with a number of enforcement actions
against these new menaces and eventually gained control over their operations. The
courts universally found these firms to be selling futures or prohibited commodity
options contracts when they were being offered to the public. Markham, supra note
53, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
Confusing this muddled situation were the so-called leverage contracts being of-
fered under the Commodity Exchange Act. These were essentially installment sales
contracts for precious metals and coins. The SEC had brought a fraud action against
the largest of these firms that were offering these contracts in California before the
existence of the CFTC. SEC v. Monex Int'l Ltd., (C.D. Cal 1974), described in SEC
Litigation Release No. 6638 (Dec. 12, 1974). The CFTC was created in the middle of
that litigation, and it was given exclusive jurisdiction over those contracts. There then
began a running battle between the CFTC and the leverage merchant dealers that
see-sawed back and forth for several years. Finally, the CFTC adopted such restrictive
regulations that they were essentially killed. MARKHAM, supra note 21, at 179-92.
62 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The SEC was aided in its attack by the commodity options
scandals. Nevertheless, the CFTC successfully fought off the SEC's jurisdiction in sev-
eral battles before Congress. In 1982, the agencies sought to bury their differences by
reaching a concordant known as the Shad/Johnson Accords, named after the chair-
men of the two agencies. This agreement divided jurisdiction among derivative in-
struments between the SEC and the CFTC, and it was enacted into law. Don L.
Horwitz and Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Scene I, 39 Bus. LAw. 67, 72-76 (1983). Essentially, the CFTC was given exclusive
jurisdiction over futures contracts on commodities; although the SEC was given what
amounted to an effective veto power over futures contracts on securities indexes. The
CFTC was also given exclusive jurisdiction on commodity options and options on fu-
tures contracts including indexes; but once again the veto provision was given to the
SEC on indexes. The SEC was given exclusive jurisdiction over securities options that
had been given exchange trading status in 1973,just before the creation of the CFTC.
Jurisdiction over derivative instruments on currencies was more confusing. The
CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction on options and futures contracts and currencies
traded on contract markets that it regulated and the SEC was given jurisdiction over
options on currencies traded on the securities exchanges, principally the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange. Commodity options on currencies traded over-the-counter seem to
have been given to the CFTC unless, as discussed below, they were subject to the so
called Treasury Amendment. Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982).
The Shad/Johnson Accords did not end all the disputes between the SEC and
the CFTC. They were to rage anew when the Stock Market crash of 1987 raised seri-
ous concerns that the derivative futures markets were superseding the roles of the
securities exchanges. Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market
Crash of 1987-The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993
(1988).
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by adding an exemptive provision to the otherwise all-encompass-
ing jurisdiction of the CFTC in the form of what was known as the
Treasury Amendment. This provision stated that the Commodity
Exchange Act does not apply to transactions in foreign currency
and certain other financial transactions. 63 As will be discussed be-
low, that provision is uncertain in scope and has presented particu-
lar problems in dealing with over-the-counter derivative
instruments.
II. THE BIRTH OF THE UNREGULATED DERIVATIVES
Distracted by the commodity options scandals and its quarrels
with the SEC, the CFTC paid little attention to the incipient growth
of derivative financial instruments that were being developed by'
and for financial institutions. Initially few in number, they soon
turned into a cataract.64
One of the first of these instruments was a silver bond offered
by the Sunshine Mining Company in 1980. These bonds were in-
dexed to the price of silver and were redeemable at the indexed
price if it were greater than $1000, the face value of the bond. The
bond offered investors an opportunity to receive a fixed minimum
return at a reduced interest rate and also to receive the opportu-
nity to profit should the price of silver rise.65 The investor paid a
premium for that opportunity in the form of reduced interest rates
on the bond.66
63 The Treasury Amendment stated that nothing in the Commodity Exchange Act:
shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in
foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, re-sales of install-
ment loan contracts, re-purchase options, government securities, or
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transac-
tions involve the sales thereof for future delivery conducted on a board
of trade.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
64 These instruments were initially called "hybrid" instruments because they had
characteristics of both securities and commodity futures or options. For a history of
their development, see David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under
the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1599 (1986); Markham,
supra note 53, at 1-2.
65 Such commodity price linked notes became popular in 1994 with increases in
commodity prices. Thomas T. Vogel Jr., Commodity -Linked Notes Dazzle Inflation-Dread-
ing Bond Buyers, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at C1.
66 MARKHAM, supra note 21, at 227-28. This bond was not completely unique.
Bonds have been historically offered with payment required in gold, silver, or other
specie. See Richard Coal Mining & Mfg.'Co. 6% gold bonds offered in 1893, in Old
Dominion Paper Collectibles Catalog for Summer & Fall 1994, at All (Chesterfield,
VA); Virginia Interest Coupons payable in gold coins offered in 1930, id. at A18; Con-
necticut Treasury certificates payable in Spanish milled dollars or other gold or silver
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The CFTC was either unaware of, or did not concern itself
with, the offering of this bond. That attitude was to change as the
growth of similar derivatives and more exotic investments began to
multiply in the 1980s. During this period, the CFTC began to con-
sider these instruments on an ad hoc basis. Some passed muster,
while others did not.67 For example, the CFTC staff authorized an
offering of subordinated ventures that were to be paid at an annual
rate of ten-and-a-half percent with additional payments based on
increases in the price of natural gas.' The CFTC, however, ques-
tioned another proposal involving oil under which the Standard
Oil Company sought to issue notes attached to a debenture that
would be separately tradeable. The holder of this instrument was
to be given a principal sum plus a premium for increases in crude
oil prices over a specified amount. The CFTC eventually allowed
this offer to go forward but asserted that it would not allow similar
offerings in the future.69
The CFTC's ad hoc interpretations also affected instruments
that were based on inflation factors, and hybrid instruments began
to intrude into the agricultural area.70 Some instruments, how-
ever, such as swaps and certain interest rate contracts that allowed
investors to cap their interest rate obligations or set floors on those
obligations, seemed to escape notice entirely.71
The CFTC eventually commenced rulemaking proceedings to
deal with the increased rate of new derivative financial instru-
coin equivalent offered in the following years: 1781, 1789, and 1790, in ANDERSON,
supra note 14, at 113-14, 116; Connecticut Treasury certificates payable in gold, silver,
lawful silver money, or bills of credit offered in the following years: 1780, 1781, and
1784, id. at 112, 115; Massachusetts Bay Colony loan certificates payable in Spanish
Milled Dollars or gold and silver specie offered in the following years: 1775, 1777,
and 1781, id. at 128, 131, 136; Commonwealth of Massachusetts Treasury certificates
payable in gold and sliver coins offered in 1782, id. at 137.
67 Markham, supra note 53.
68 CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 88-17, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 24,320 (Sept. 6. 1988).
69 DavidJ. Gilberg, supra note 64, at 1665-66. The CFTC staff advised another firm
that certain "commodity certificates" were futures contracts that had to be traded on
the exchange because the certificates entitled the holder to receive the prevailing
price of the commodity unit or $1000, whichever was greater. MARKHAM, supra note
21, at 230. The CFTC also concluded that gold warrants were prohibited futures con-
tracts, and the CFTC brought suit against Wells Fargo Bank for offering gold market
certificates that the CFTC concluded contained elements of options. CFTC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 87-07992 (N.D. Cal. (Nov. 19, 1987). The CFTC staff,
however, indicated that bullion purchase programs were not futures contracts. CFTC
Interpretative Letter No. 85-2 [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
70 Markham, supra note 53, at 34-39.
71 Id. at 27-28.
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
ments.7 2 In adopting those rules, the CFTC concluded that instru-
ments containing more futures or options elements than typical
interest rate or similar instruments would be treated as regulated
futures or options.73 The rules exempted hybrid debt instruments,
certain preferred equity or depository instruments with commodity
option components and demand deposits, bond deposits, or trans-
actions accounts offered by federally insured financial institu-
tions."4 For other instruments, the value of implied option
premiums could not outweigh the commodity independent com-
ponents. The CFTC established a complex formula for making
that determination.75 A CFTC Task Force on Off-Exchange Instru-
ments also finally focused on swap transactions. It concluded that
they should not be regulated as futures or commodity options.7 6
The CFTC's rulemaking efforts did not bring any degree of
certainty into the regulation of these new derivative financial in-
struments. To the contrary, confusion seemed to grow. One case
in particular raised eyebrows around the world. In Transnor (Ber-
muda) Ltd. v. B.P. North American Petroleum,77 a United States Dis-
trict Court held that transactions in the Brent Oil Market were
futures contracts that were subject to the Commodity Exchange
Act. This meant that this international market would have to regis-
ter with the CFTC as a contract market and that the contracts that
had heretofore traded on that market were illegal because the mar-
ket had not been so licensed.7"
72 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (Dec. 11, 1987).
73 17 C.F.R. § 34.2 (1993).
74 37 C.F.R. § 34.3 (1993).
75 17 C.F.R. § 34.2 (1993).
76 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,494 (July 21, 1989). Collar agreements were also
later exempted. They allow minimum and maximum changes on price changes or
interest rates. CFTC-OETF Interpretative Letter No. 90-1, [1987-1990 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,583 (Jan. 18, 1990).
77 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
78 Most interesting was the fact that the contracts at issue in the Transnor case were
entered into by a Bermuda corporation with oil companies located outside the
United States. The oil was to be delivered in Scotland, and the transactions were
conducted in London and made subject to English law. Id. at 1474-75.
The CFTC intervened in the Brent Oil matter to issue a statutory interpretation
in which it asserted that the district court decision was wrong, and that the Brent oil
market should not be subject to regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act. The
effect of the CFTC's assertion was uncertain because it did not have any exemptive
powers. Rather, its claims simply conflicted with those of the district court. See Statu-
tory Interpretations Concerning Forward Transactions, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
29,925 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 25, 1990). See generally Eric Bettelheim &Jerry W. Markham,
The Transnor Decision and its Aftermath, 8 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 76 (1990); Eric
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The currency market also raised concerns as to the application
of the exchange trading requirement. The CFTC had taken the
position in 1985 that individuals could not trade in the inter-bank
currency market and that the Treasury Amendment exemption did
not apply to individuals. The CFTC was of the view that the Treas-
ury Amendment applied only when currency transactions were en-
gaged in by banks and other corporate institutional participants. 79
The inter-bank currency market, however, had operated for years
as an international market in which transactions in currency were
conducted for speculation and hedging by wealthy individuals as
well as corporate institutions.8" The CFTC subsequently concluded
that it would have to re-examine its position in view of this opposi-
tion and because of protests by the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of the Treasury.81
Bettelheim & Jerry W. Markham, More on Transnor, 8 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 223
(1990).
The Transnor decision also raised concern with the effect of the CFTC's interpre-
tation in which it had concluded that swap transactions were not subject to the Com-
modity Exchange Act. If a court were to determine that they were subject to the
Commodity Exchange Act, then such transactions would be illegal. The CFTC had no
exemptive authority, it had only the authority to seek to persuade a court of the cor-
rectness of its interpretation of the scope of the Commodity Exchange Act.
The CFTC's position was also inconsistent with its approach in another case in
which it appeared as amicus curiae. There the CFTC claimed that commercial transac-
tions in precious metals were futures contracts that had to be traded on contract
markets even though the participants were commercial entities. See In re Bybee, 945
F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth circuit, held, however, that the transactions were
not subject to CFTC jurisdiction because they were deferred delivery contracts. In
reaching that decision, the court relied on the CFTC's interpretative statement for
the Brent Oil market. Id.
79 Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983, [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,750 (C.F.T.C. 1985).
80 Prior to the adoption of the Treasury Amendment, it had been reported that
individuals were participating in the inter-bank currency market and that these con-
tracts were "similar to the standard commodity-futures contract, which is also used by
companies to hedge against price fluctuations." Personal Investing, Speculating in Ex-
change, FORTUNE, Feb. 1963, 201-04. One commentator also pointed out that posi-
tions in currency transactions were engaged in "without any intention of either
delivery or taking delivery of a foreign currency; ... [the trader] simply hopes that its
,spot' price will move in its favor. Whether it does or not, he must close out or 'un-do'
the contract on the date specified." Id.; see also Markham, supra note 53, at 9-10;
Money: Everybody Plays the Currency Game, Bus. WEEK, May 4, 1974, 34 ("Foreign Ex-
change Dealings no longer concern just the multi-national companies, the biggest
banks, and the wealthiest individuals. Anybody doing business handling money on an
international basis is affected.").
81 Markham, supra note 53, at 10 (foonote omitted). Indeed, several years later,
the CFIC reversed its position when it appeared as amicus curiae in a proceeding
before the Fourth Circuit. In that case, Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966,
979-80 (4th Cir. 1993), the circuit court held that a wealthy individual trading in over-
the-counter currency futures and options contracts could not claim that the transac-
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Recognizing the uncertainty that lay in the area of these devel-
oping derivative financial instruments, particularly swaps which
had grown to monumental proportions, Congress enacted the Fu-
tures Trading Practices Act of 1992.82 That legislation amended
the Commodity Exchange Act to provide the CFTC with some ex-
emptive power for institutional traders. This was needed, not only
to remove the legal uncertainties of swaps and other over-the-
counter derivatives, but also because the derivative products traded
by institutions were individually negotiated and would not fit
within the standardized format required for exchange trading. In
addition, the institutions did not need the protections for small
customers that is a central part of the CFTC's regulatory efforts.8"
The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 allowed the CFTC
to exempt any transaction by "appropriate persons" from the ex-
change trading requirement. Appropriate persons include institu-
tional participants such as banks, insurance companies, investment
companies, commodity pools, broker-dealers, corporations of a
specific size, and the "other persons." The CFTC has adopted reg-
ulations to implement that legislation by, among other things, ex-
empting swaps transactions by institutions.84
III. OTHER HISTORICAL CONCERNS WITH DERIVATIVES
Another large market -that raised regulatory concerns with de-
rivative instruments was the United States government securities
market. That market, the largest securities market in the world,
raises trillions of dollars.85 That market was composed of some
thirty-six primary dealers with monthly trading volume over $1.5
tions were illegal. The court held that the Treasury Amendment exempted the trans-
actions from the exchange trading requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act
because they were individually negotiated between sophisticated parties.
The Tauber decision was useful in providing assurance that wealthy, sophisticated
individuals can participate in the inter-bank currency market. There is still uncer-
tainty, however, over what constitutes the wealth or sophistication required to be ex-
empted. A Second Circuit decision has also held that option contracts on foreign
currency sold to the general public were subject to the Commodity Exchange Act.
The Second Circuit in that decision indicated that private individuals were not subject
to the Treasury Amendment. CFTC v. American Board of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1249
(2d Cir. 1986).
82 Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590.
83 Maitland & Markham, supra note 8, at 20.
The exchange monopoly under the Commodity Exchange Act had also led to
abuses and restriction of competition. Markham, supra note 5, at 982-84.
84 Maitland & Markham, supra note 8, at 20.
85 S. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986). The government securities mar-
ket includes such things as T-bonds, T-bills, GNMAs, Freddie Macs, Fannie Maes, and
Sallie Maes. H.R. REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 note 1 (1985).
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trillion when problems developed that required regulation. 6
In the seven years prior to 1985, failures of government bond
dealers resulted in aggregate losses of almost one billion dollars.87
A substantial portion of these losses were due to so-called "repos"
or "reverse repos" transactions that were widely used in trading
government securities.88 These are simply repurchase agreements
to sell and buy back, or to buy and sell back, government securi-
ties.8 9 Repos were used for short term financing and investment
purposes,90 and they soon "became the most important financing
86 H.R. REP. No. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985). There were also several hundred
secondary dealers participating in the government securities market. H. R. No. 258,
99 Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1985); S. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986).
The SEC noted that:
The market for government securities is by far the world's largest and
most efficient securities market. The monthly trading value of just the
36 primary government dealers that report to the FRB amounts to over
$1.5 trillion or approximately 15 times the volume of all transactions in
corporate securities traded on all of the nation's securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets..
REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, REPORT BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (footnotes omitted) (June 20, 1985) [hereinafter REGU-
LATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET]. The United States government se-
curities market had grown to $4.9 trillion by 1993. Exchange Act Release No. 33-
33743 (Mar. 9, 1994).
87 REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 86, at 8.
88 In re Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 67 Bankr. 557, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 92,966 (D.N.J. 1986).
89 A repurchase agreement is simply an agreement to sell securities with a commit-
ment to repurchase the same securities from the buyer at a later date. The seller
agrees to repurchase the securities for cash and some additional amount of interest at
a future date. A reverse repo is simply an agreement to buy government securities
and to resell them at a later date. This allows flexibility in short term financing, and
dealers could do back-to-back repos and reverse repos as intermediaries. See generally
SEC STUDY ON THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE SECURITIES IN-
DUSTRY 20 n.48 (CCH) (Jan. 23, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 SEC NET CAPITAL STUDY];
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING
GUIDE: AUDITS OF BROKERS AND DEA ERS IN SECURITIES 10 (1985).
Repos were first used in the Federal Reserve System in 1917; they were more
extensively used after World War II; and they have been used by commercial banks
since 1969 because the Federal Reserve Board allowed them to be exempt from re-
serve requirements. In 1975, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York also began en-
gaging in Repos with commercial banks. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
THE USE OF REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS BY BROKER-DEALERS 2 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS BY BROKER-DEALERS]. See also SIDNEY ROBBINS, THE SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 12 (1966) (Repurchase agreements were used
by the banks in their federal funds arrangements in the mid 1960's).
90 Repos were used chiefly for U.S. Treasury bills but also for mortgaged backed
securities such as GNMAs, Fannie Maes and Freddie Macs, as well as in municipal
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vehicle for the broker-dealer industry."91 The amount of repos
grew from $14.8 billion in 1977 to almost two hundred billion dol-
lars in 1986.92
Repos were not devoid of risk, particularly where sufficient col-
lateral or margin was not obtained to secure the return of the se-
curities in the event of an adverse market move.9" These risks led
to some substantial and highly publicized failures. The failure of
one of those companies, ESM Government Securities, caused a sav-
ings and loan crisis in Ohio, as well as a rise in gold prices and a fall
in the value of a dollar.9 4 The failure of Bevell, Bresler and Schul-
man Asset Management Corporation resulted in customer losses of
some two hundred and thirty-five million dollars.95 The collapse of
Drysdale Government Securities resulted in customer losses of
some three hundred million dollars,96 and the failure of Lion Capi-
tal Group caused investors to lose another forty million dollars.97
securities and corporate bonds. REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS BY BROKER-DEALERS, supra
note 89, at 5.
91 Id. at 3.
92 Id.
93 See In reAndrew L. Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30731 (May 21, 1992).
Repos initially were thought to carry little risk because the buyer in a repurchase
agreement transferred cash to a seller and receives collateral in the form of the securi-
ties. However, in some instances the securities had been pledged to other persons; in
other instances the securities that were subject to repurchase had declined in value;
and in still other cases, where the securities had excess margin, the difference was
lost. REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS BY BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 89, at 12-18.
94 The failure of ESM caused losses of over $300 million. Most of those losses were
incurred by two savings and loan associations controlled by the same person. REGULA-
TION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 86, at 10-11.
95 H.R. REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 n.25 (1985). Bevill Bresler Schul-
man Asset Management Corp. had entered into repurchase agreements without
proper collateralization. The firm did so in order to cover large trading losses of an
affiliate. REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 86, at 12.
96 Drysdale had repurchase agreements and short sales amounting to some five
billion dollars in U.S. government securities through Chase Manhattan Bank. It de-
faulted on about $160 million of interest payments due on those securities. Steven L.
Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealer's Financial Responsibility under the Uniform Net
Capital Rule-A Casefor Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1983); Kathryn M. Welling, The
Drysdale Affair, A Blow-By-Blow Account of the Default That Shook Wall Street, BARRON'S,
May 24, 1982, at 15. Drysdale had also bought securities with accrued interest for its
repurchase transactions because customers did not take interest into account in valu-
ing their securities in the repurchase arrangement. Drysdale was able to use the inter-
est in its operations. Drysdale, however, was unable to repay the interest when it came
due, and this caused losses of some $300 million. REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 86, at 9-10.
97 The failure of Lion caused losses of some $40 million. Lion's clearing agent
claimed that securities held for it by Lion were security for loans made by the clearing
agency to Lion. The clearing agency contended, therefore, that securities were not
being held on behalf of customers. REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MAR-
KET, supra note 86, at 10.
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These failures were due in large measure to the fact that the
government securities market was only loosely regulated.
Although many broker-dealers in that market were registered with
the SEC or subject to the oversight of the banking authorities,
many of the participants-some twenty-five percent of the mar-
ket-were virtually unregulated by anyone.98 Moreover, the mar-
ket was subject to a great deal of leverage because there were no
margin requirements for government securities. 99
Following these failures, the SEC proposed and adopted
changes to its net capital rules to reduce the amount of leverage in
repos.10 The SEC required specific disclosures of risks in repo
transactions to be made by broker-dealers to their customers.''
Congress also responded to these failures by enacting the Govern-
ment Securities Act of 1986.102 This legislation required dealers in
government securities to register with the SEC or, in the case of a
financial institution regulated by the banking or thrift authorities,
to file a notice with their regulator. The Secretary of the Treasury
was given authority to adopt rules governing the financial responsi-
bility, custody, and use of government securities owned by custom-
ers, transfer and control of government securities in repo
transactions, and record keeping requirements.' The SEC was
given authority to enforce those regulations against government se-
curities broker-dealers registered with it, and the banking agencies
were given authority to enforce those regulations against the banks
they regulate. 0 4
Other unregistered government security dealers that failed included Financial
Corp. of Kansas City; Winters Government Securities; Lombard-Wall; Comark; and
Hibbard & O'Connor Government Securities. S. REP. No. 426,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-
7 (1986); Exchange Act Release No. 34-21959 (Apr. 19, 1985). For another case in
which a broker-dealer dealing in government securities and repos became insolvent,
see SEC v. Legel, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 97,513 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
98 H. R. REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1985).
The SEC conducted a broad investigation of the government securities market
following the failures of the unregulated dealers. The SEC concluded that most of
the losses were the result of failures on the part of "fringe" participants who were not
primary dealers. REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 86,
at 16.
99 H.R. REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1985).
100 Exchange Act Release No. 34-23602 (Sept. 4, 1986); Exchange Act Release No.
34-24553 (June 4, 1987).
101 Exchange Act Release No. 34-24778 (Aug. 6, 1987).
102 Pub. L. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986).
103 Letter to Congressman Lamar Smith from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Assistant Di-
rector SEC, 1988 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1037 (July 22, 1988).
104 S. REP. No. 426,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986). See generally DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND FEDERAL RESERVE BoARn, JOINT RE-
PORT ON THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET (Jan. 1992).
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Another important development in the 1980s was the so-called
"pass-through" securities or collateralized mortgage obligations,
which might be viewed to have derivative characteristics. 10 5 These
were, for example, moritgage pools in which investors were sold
participations and which facilitated the raising of a significant
amount of capital for the mortgage market.1" 6 The Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 was designed to bol-
ster the secondary mortgage market by exempting such transac-
tions from margin requirements and by allowing banks to invest in
secondary mortgage market obligations.1" 7
Related in concept to the derivative based mortgage-backed
securities are "asset backed," "pass through" securities or "securi-
tized" assets. These are simply interests in pools of assets or reve-
nue streams. These securities quickly spread to encompass almost
every form of asset or revenue stream that could be included in a
pool and sold in units as a security. This financing technique al-
lowed an almost immediate realization of cash for assets such as
credit card debts and franchise fees, or it could be used to finance
the acquisition of assets. These securities were subject to the provi-
sions of the federal securities laws,'0 ' but concerns with their trad-
ing have been raised as a part of the debate on derivatives,
particularly after large losses were experienced from these instru-
ments in early 1994.109
Municipal bond trading was another area of unregulated trad-
ing that caused Congressional concern even before the 1980s. This
trading was conducted by firms who acted as dealers for their own
account, banks trading for their own account and brokers who ac-
ted as agents for buyers and sellers. Although some nine hundred
firms were engaged in this business in the 1970s, some one hun-
dred and twenty-five firms dominated the underwriting of new mu-
105 "Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations are also a
form of derivatives." 139 Cong. Rec. H3821-04, 3822-04 (1994) (statement of Rep.
Gonzalez).
106 S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
107 Pub. L. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984). See generally KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
(1994).
108 See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991).
109 See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text; see also Michael Siconolfi & Laura
Jereski, Arm Twister, Kidder's Mr. Vranos Uses Brain and Brawn To Pump Up Profits, WALL
ST. J., May 20, 1994, at Al; Laura Jereski, Fed Studies Mortgage-Backed Market, WALL ST.
J., May 20, 1994, at Cl. See generally David Wessel et al., Stormy Spring Three-Month
Tumult In Bonds Lays Bare New Financial Forces, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1994, at Al.
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nicipal bond issues and were principally, responsible for
maintaining a secondary market in those securities.
Like derivatives, the growth in municipal bond trading had
been extraordinary. Underwritings grew from some seven billion
dollars in 1959 to almost twenty-three billion dollars by 1974.110
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exempted municipal securi-
ties from its definition of a security. As a result, banks or brokers
and dealers trading only municipal securities did not have to regis-
ter with the SEC.'11 Nevertheless, the SEC could and did bring
numerous fraud actions against persons dealing in these securities,
even if they were not registered. Those cases revealed such wide-
spread abuses that Congress was compelled to act to implement
additional regulation.'11
The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 required the registra-
tion of municipal securities dealers with the SEC. Bank depart-
ments handling municipal securities transactions were required to
register with the SEC as municipal securities dealers, but enforce-
ment powers over banks remained with the banking authorities.11
A Municipal Securities Rule Making Board was also established by
the Securities Act Amendments of 1975. The Board is a self-regula-
tory body composed of members representing securities firms,
banks' representatives, and the public. The Board is a hybrid body
that was given the responsibility of enacting rules for the registra-
tion and regulation of bank and non-bank municipal securities
dealers. The Board's authority is limited to proposing and adopt-
ing rules to regulate transactions in municipal securities that must
110 The latter figure was almost equal to the some twenty six billion dollars of new
corporate securities, including common, preferred, and debt issues, that were under-
written in 1974. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1975). The dollar amount of
municipal securities outstanding grew from almost seventy one billion dollars in 1960
to over two hundred billion dollars in 1974. Id. at 41.
111 Id. at42.
112 From 1970-1975, the SEC brought numerous actions that revealed:
a disturbing pattern of professional misconduct by a significant number
of broker-dealers. This pattern is characterized by unconscionable
markups, churning of customers' accounts, misrepresentations concern-
ing the nature and value of municipal securities, disregard of suitabil-
ity standards, and scandalous high-pressure sales techniques. The
selling practices of these firms involves all the characteristics of the clas-
sic 'boiler room' operation. These practices are intended to induce
hasty investment decisions with respect to securities unfamiliar to poten-
tial customers. Furthermore, it appears that certain firms exerted ex-
traordinary pressures on their salesmen to increase sales without regard
to the welfare of the firm's customers.
Id. at 43.
113 ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAw OF PUBLIC FINANCE 331 (1988).
19941
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be approved by the SEC before they are effective. Enforcement of
the rules is left to the SEC, the NASD, and the banking
authorities.'14
IV. DERIVATIVE DANGERS PROVE To BE ALL Too REAL
The determination in 1992 by Congress to exempt institu-
tional investors from the reach of the Commodity Exchange Act
was a wise one.11 Certainly, such institutions do not require the
public customer protections that are imposed by the Commodity
Exchange Act. On the other hand, some of these institutions are
finding that derivative financial transactions pose risks that they
neither understand nor appreciate. Indeed, the size and complex-
ity of this market is such that there is a serious danger that these
instruments can jeopardize the health of even the most powerful
financial institution and can even pose a threat to our financial
system.1 1
6
Experience thus proved all too soon that concerns with the
dangers presented by derivative instruments were not entirely un-
warranted.117 To cite some examples, the English House of Lords
ruled that municipal governments in England that had engaged in
swap transactions were not authorized to do so and that, therefore,
the transactions were invalid. 1 Macy's defaulted on a swap con-
tract that involved some $83 million in interest payments; 119 a unit
114 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 418-22 (1990).
115 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
116 Opponents of regulation argue, however, that derivatives actually have a stabiliz-
ing effect on the economy. Thomas C. Theobald, Derivatives Aren't the Danger, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A14.
117 Derivative trading has been profitable for firms dealing in those instruments in
past years. In analyzing ten years of trading results, a Congressional report found that
derivative dealers had quarterly trading losses only four times, totaling nineteen mil-
lion dollars. In contrast, trading revenues earned were in excess of thirty five billion
dollars for a "two thousand to one profit-to-loss." LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 151.
118 Tracy Corrigan, Lords Rule Rate Swaps Illegal More than 100 Local Authorities Could
Now Face Legal Action From Their Banks, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1991, at Section I, 18. The
amount of the losses sustained by the counterparties to those transactions is un-
known. For a discussion of losses suffered by one firm as a result of this ruling, how-
ever, see THE REPORT OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OTC
DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR REGULATION, Working Papers 4-1, 4-19 (Oct. 1993)
[hereinafter CFTC REPORT).
119 Swiss Bank Corporation sued other banks for $83 million dollars for interest
payments that Macy's defaulted on under a swap contract when it went into bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Martin Mayer, A Bad Swap for Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., June 16,
1993, at A18. A former CFTC chairman has also noted, however, that Drexel Burham
Lambert, Olympia & York, and the Bank of New England exemplify large firms whose
derivative positions were successfully transferred after those firms failed from causes
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of Metallgesellschaft A.G. lost some $1.37 billion from mismatched
derivative transactions; 2 ' Kashima Oil in Japan lost some $1.5 bil-
lion in currency transactions; 12 1 Gibson Greetings Inc. lost some
$19 million from derivative trading;122 Kidder Peabody lost some
$350 million in "phantom" derivative trades;123 a New York munici-
pal bond fund failed to disclose that some 40 percent of its assets
were invested in derivatives; 24 Procter & Gamble lost over $150
million from derivative trading; 25 Orange County in California
unrelated to their derivatives trading. Wendy Lee Gramm, In Defense of Derivatives,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at A12.
When Drexel Burham Lambert Group Inc. went bankrupt it had to swap transac-
tions with a subsidiary, DBL Products in 1990, its transactions were eventually un-
wound and settled. HOUSE BANKING COMMITTEE MINORITY STAFF, FINANCIAL
DEIVATVES (Part 1) No. 1 at 43 (Nov. 1993). DBL Products disposed of 90% of the
firm's swap transactions within two months after the unwinding process had begun.
The firm, however, had been threatened with the use of "walk away" clauses in its
contracts, which allowed non-defaulting parties to walk away from their obligations.
Over seventy percent of the DBL Products counterparties owed money but very few
walked away from their contracts. This was due to threats of ligation by DBL Products
and concern that other counterparties would refuse to deal in the future with a party
walking away from its obligations. Id. at 124. In Drexel Burnham Lambert Products
Corp. v. Midland Bank, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21223 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), a district court
also held that a two way payment clause was valid and not a penalty payment.
For a discussion of these and other defaults involving derivative instruments, see
CFTC REPORT, supra note 118, Working Paper 4-1.
120 Jeffrey Taylor & Allanna Sullivan, German Firm Finds Hedges Can Be Thorny, WALL
ST.J.,Jan. 10, 1994, at C1. The losses were suffered by MG Corp., a United States unit
of Metallgesellschaft A.G. Counter suits have been filed by the company and its trad-
ers against each other. Metallgesellschaft to File Countersuit Over Trading Losses, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 1994, at A10. Jeffrey Taylor & Kenneth H. Bacon, How the Nyrmex Cooled
MG's Oil Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1994, at Cl; Big Concern Trims Losses, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1994, at C16.
121 Determined Loser, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 82.
122 Gibson Will Take a Charge To Cover Its Trading Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at
C6; Gabriella Stern, Gibson Greetings Incurs $3 Million Loss From Unauthorized Interest-
Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at A4.
123 Amal Kumar Naj, GE's First-Quarter Operating Profit Fell 1.6%, Reflecting Charge at
Kidder Unit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A4; Floyd Norris, Where the Trading Went
Awry, Many Perplexing Questions Arise Over Bond Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at
C13; Michael Siconolfi, Kidder Discloses Phony Trades, Fires a Trader, WALL ST. J., Apr.
18, 1994, at A3; Michael Siconolfi, Saga of Kidder'sJett: Sudden Downfall Of an Aggressive
Wall Street Trader, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at A3. See also Michael Siconolfi, Kidder
Peabody Fired Bond Aide On Ties to Rival WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3; Michael
Siconolfi, Kidder Firing May Indicate Further Woes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1994, at A3.
124 Robert McGough, Bond Fund Sets Disclosure Pact on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Apr.
18, 1994, at C1.
125 Susan Antilla, P. & G. Sees Charge on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at C1;
Steven Lipin et al., Portfolio Poker, Just What Funds Do With Derivatives'Is Suddenly a Hot
Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994, at Al; Tracy Corrigan, Finger Points at Banks After
Procter's Gamble, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at 19; Gabriella Stern, P & G Is Said To Be
Considering Cutting Bonuses, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1994, at A2. The losses at Procter &
Gamble were from "diff" swaps that were based on an assumption that three year
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lost $140 million;1 6 David Askin's Granite Hedge Fund had losses
of an estimated $600 million from "market neutral" derivatives; 27
City College of Chicago has sued claiming that it was misled in the
purchase of $100 million in derivative obligations; 28 Cargill's
hedge funds lost some $100 million from mortgage backed securi-
ties; 1  Piper Capital Management was having difficulty valuing its
derivatives and lost some $700 million from derivative transac-
tions;"' ° HYM Financial Inc. in NewJersey lost all of its capital from
derivatives;"' Dell Computer lost some $26 million from derivative
based transactions; 132 Air Products took a loss of $69 million on
interest rates in Germany and America would converge more slowly than predicted by
the market. Corporate Hedging Hard Soap, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 82; see also
Laura Jereski & Ellen E. Schultz, Glaxo Holdings Is Taking a Hit On Derivatives, WALL
ST. J., July 13, 1994, at C1 (describing losses approaching $100 million by Glaxo due
to investments in derivatives).
126 Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Derivatives Roil California Political Race, WALL ST. J., Apr.
15, 1994, at Cl.
127 Lipin et al., supra note 125, at Al; Lipin & Raghavan, supra note 9, at Cl. See also
Thomas L. Freidman, House Panel Given a Lesson in Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1994, at D1. See also George Graham, Derivatives Loss Fuels Call For Legislation, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at 7 (describing calls for legislation for greater oversight of the
derivatives market due to losses in derivatives trading by a Maryland county
administration).
128 Corrigan, supra note 125, at 19; see also G. Bruce Knecht, Tempers Flare on Main
Street Over Derivatives Vehicle, WALL ST. J.,July 14, 1994, at C1 (describing losses due to
derivatives sustained by a Minnesota town whose officials invested money in a fund
that appeared to invest in U.S. government securities but actually invested most of its
funds in derivatives).
129 Cargill Says Market Moves Won't Hurt Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at D5;
Laura Jereski, Mortgage Derivatives Claim Victims Big and Small WALL ST. J., Apr. 20,
1994, at Cl. See also Barbara Donnelly Granito & Laura Jereski, Tough Times Plague
Mortgage-Back Securities, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, atCI (Mortgage derivatives in the
form of collateralized mortgage obligations have been "violently torpedoed" by the
effects of rate rises).
130 Jereski, supra note 129, at C15; Robert McGough, PiperJaffray Acts to Boost Bat-
tered Fund, WALL ST.J., May 23, 1994, at Cl; G. Bruce Knecht, Piper Manager's Losses
May Total $700 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Cl.
131 Jereski, supra note 129, at C15. See also Larry M. Greenberg, Bank of Montreal's
Harris Unit Records $51.3 Million Loss from Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,June 27, 1994, at A4
(describing Harris Trust & Savings absorption of $51.3 million of losses on high-risk
mortgage derivatives that were kept in supposedly low-risk institutional customer ac-
counts); Mortgage-backed Securities: Not for Widows, Orphans---or Hedge Funds, THE EcON-
OMIST, July 9, 1994, at 81 (discussing the problems of Wall Street securities firms in
dealing with the unpredictability of securitised mortgages due to prepayment risks
and rising long-term interest rates).
132 Scott McCartney, Dell Computer Posts 86% Surge in Net For Quarter, Will Cut Deriva-
tives Risk, WALL ST.J., May 25, 1994, at B3. The company had a derivatives portfolio of
some $355 million. The company's stock rose after it announced large earnings in-
creases despite the derivatives losses and after it announced that it was curtailing its
derivatives trading. See generally Steven Lipin et al., Fancy Footwork, Bankers Trust Thrives
Pitching Derivatives, But Climate Is Shifting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.
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derivative contracts;133 an employee investment fund of Atlantic
Richfield Company lost $22 million in derivative trades; several mu-
tual funds were compensated by their advisors or brokers for mil-
lions of dollars in losses suffered from derivatives transactions;1 3 4
and Mead Corporation lost over $12 million from derivatives
trading. 135
133 James P. Miller, Air Products Takes a Charge of $60 Million, WALL ST. J., May 12,
1994, at A3; Air Products Adds Charge for Swaps Losses, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at C14;
Air Products Raises Estimate on Derivatives Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1994, at C2.
134 See Susan Antilla, Mutual Fund Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at Cl; Sara
Calian, BankAmerica's Cost to Rescue 2 Funds Soars, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1994, at A2 (dis-
cussing BankAmerica Corp.'s almost $70 million bailout of two "normally sedate"
funds due to losses on derivatives); Sara Calian & GeorgetteJasen, CS First Boston Fund
Is Among Those With Losses on Derivative Instruments, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at B5;
Sara Calian & Georgette Jasen, Managers Prop up Money-Market Funds With Quiet
Bailouts in Face of Losses, WALL ST. J.,June 10, 1994, at Cl; Leslie Eaton, Paine Webber to
Bail Out Fund Battered by Complex Securities, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at 1 (detailing a
$268 million bailout by Paine Webber of its Short-Term U.S. Government Securities
Fund that had experienced enormous losses from derivatives); James K. Glassman,
Steer Clear of Funds Too Good to Be True, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1994, at HI (describing
losses sustained by "below average" risk intermediate-term bond funds due to dealings
in derivatives); Robert McGough & Sara Calian, Adviser Puts Cash in Zweig Cash Fund
To Compensate for Losses in Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1994, at C20; Robert Mc-
Gough & Sara Calian, Funds Pay Price for Mortgage Derivatives' Returns, WALL ST. J., June
9, 1994, at Cl; Robert McGough & Anita Raghavan, Paine Webber Again Props Up Bond
Fund, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1994, at C1 (analyzing Paine Webber's efforts to retain
investor confidence after losses due to derivatives in what was described as a safe
fund). Congress and the SEC are scruntizing these losses. Mark H. Anderson, SEC
Chief Levitt Warns Mutual Funds To Be Cautious in Handling Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,June
21, 1994, at C18; Sara Calian, Kidder Removes Derivatives From 5 Funds, WALL ST.J., Sept.
1, 1994, at A3; Saul Hansell, S.E.C. Asked to Study Derivatives in Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1994, at C14; Kitchen-Sink Bonds: Paine Webber's $180 Million Misstep, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1994, at Cl (brokerage firm spends $180 million to cover losses from
"kitchen-sink" bonds held by one of its mutual funds). See generally The Mutual Fund
Mystery, How are Mutual Funds Using OTC Derivatives? Nobody Knows for Sure, 3 DERIVA-
TIVES STRATEGY 1 (May 16, 1994); Stephen Power, SEC Officials Plan to Require Managers
To Report More Data on Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1994, at A14 (discussing
proposed action by the SEC requiring more disclosure of fund portfolios in light of
sharp declines of many mutual funds due losses tied to derivatives); SEC Is Likely to Act
Soon On Derivatives Disclosure, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at A7 (discussing measures
proposed by the SEC to convey to investors risks from bond funds and to improve
disclosure practices of bond objectives and derivatives activities).
135 Steven Lipin & Gabriella Stem, Bankers Trust Gets Big Boost From Sale Of Deriva-
tives; Another Client Has Loss, WALL ST.J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3. The drug related death
of the founder of W.R. Lazard, an investment banking firm, also raised eyebrows
when it was revealed that his firm was the subject of an investigation in connection
with millions of dollars of fees paid by the New York State Job Development Authority
in connection with derivative transactions. William Power et al., Lazard's Death Came
as Firm Was Probed, WALL ST.J., May 13, 1994, at BI; William Power, W.R. Lazard Is Said
to Be the Focus Of Ongoing Inquiry Into Possible Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1994, at A4;
Official Died of Overdose, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1994, at C4; see also Leslie Scism, Tiny
Hawaii Insurer Makes Wrong Call Using Derivatives, Is Seized by the State, WALL ST. J., July
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The amounts of these losses are not unimpressive, and they
have not passed unnoticed by regulators, Congress, and the indus-
try itself.'3 6 Indeed, a number of often voluminous reports have
20, 1994, at C1 (discussing seizure of insurance company due to losses from trading in
billions of dollars of derivatives with margin requirements at only 2%); Michael Sico-
nolfi & Anita Raghavan, CS First Boston Is Said to Repay Big Clients, WALL ST. J.,July 19,
1994, at C1 (discussing $40 million in repayments to three institutional clients after
CS First Boston made unauthorized derivatives trades in the clients' private
portfolios).
On the other side of the balance sheet, one brokerage firm announced in Mar.
of 1994 that it had made profits of over $700 million from its over-the-counter deriva-
tive products trading. Michael Siconolfi, Merrill Lynch Says Derivatives Revenue Swelled
57% to $761 Million Last Year, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1994, at A1O. Of course, the
possibility of such profits suggests that losses could be equally great in a less favorable
trading environment. Indeed, some banks have seen significant shrinkages in trading
profits from derivatives as interest rates rose. Psyched Out, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23,
1994, at 74; Gabriella Stern and Clare Ansberry, Growing Pains, Its Acquisition Binge Has
Loaded Banc One With Maze of Branches, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1994, at Al; Lipin et al.,
supra note 132, at Al; see also Lipin & Stern, supra, at A3.
136 See Kenneth H. Bacon & Greg Hitt, Derivatives Face New Regulation From Congress,
WALL ST.J., May 11, 1994, at A4. Growth of the derivatives market is expected to slow
as a result of losses, regulatory concerns, and market developments. Randall Smith &
Steven Lipin, Fast-Paced Derivatives Market Is Losing Some Speed, WALL ST. J., June 14,
1994, at Cl; Tracy Corrigan, Mood Is Sombre As Bears Spoil The Fun, FIN. TIMEs (Survey),
May 26, 1994, at I. See also Pain And Gain, THE ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 80 (discuss-
ing the downturn in the market for complex derivative instruments due to losses by
leveraged investors and bond funds); Sara Calian, Funds Prodded To Shed Assets In Deriv-
atives, WALL ST. J.,July 5, 1994, at CI (describing efforts by regulators and actions by
ratings services that encourage funds to divest high risk derivatives). But see Tim W.
Ferguson, The SEC's Common Denominator, WALL ST.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at Al5 (discussing
a poll of two hundred CEOs that found 83% satisfied with how derivatives have per-
formed, and only 2% planning to use them less in the future).
Political interest in derivatives trading was also heightened by revelations in Mar.
of 1994 that the President's wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, had made a profit of
$100,000 from a $1,000 investment in commodities futures trading. In thePink?, WALL
ST.J., Apr. 29, 1994, at A14; Bruce Ingersoll & Jeffrey Taylor, Data Confirm Mrs. Clin-
ton's Risky Trades, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1994, at A12; Dean Baquet, Jeff Gerth & Ste-
phen Labaton, Top Arkansas Lawyer Helped Hillary Clinton Turn Big Profi N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Al; Michael K. Frisby & Bruce Ingersoll, First Lady Turned $1,000
Investment Into a $98,000 Profit, Records Show, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1994, at A2. It was
later revealed that her broker had been disciplined for improperly allocating trades
among customers and for attempting to manipulate the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change egg futures market in 1970. Jeffrey Taylor and Bruce Ingersoll, Hillary Clin-
ton's Commodities Broker Was Disciplined for Variety of Violations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29,
1984, at A18. The owner of the brokerage firm where Hillary Rodham Clinton had
traded was also accused by investors of manipulating the cattle futures market during
the period when she was trading. That case was subsequently dismissed. Utesch v.
Dittmer, 947 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1991). See also Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Broker Was
Targeted In '79 Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.,June 1, 1994, at A2; BarnabyJ. Feder, Mrs. Clinton's
Windfall: The Brokers' View, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at A 10, col. 4; Stephen Labaton,
The Arkansas Broker's Office That Handled Clinton Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at A
10; Stephen Labaton, Hillary Clinton Turned $1,000 into $99,540, White House Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at A1;Jeffrey Taylor & Bruce Ingersoll, Cash Cows "Red" Bone's
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been published on financial derivatives and the dangers they
pose.137 Few, if any, of the reports have suggested any specific reg-
ulatory process for these instruments other than more financial
sheet disclosures, increased internal monitoring controls, and re-
duction of legal uncertainties in set off arrangements ("netting").
There has also been much debate on risk based net capital require-
ments and clearinghouse arrangements that will approximate an
exchange trading environment without requiring complete uni-
formity of contracts.1 38 No consensus has been reached on these
proposals, but some additional balance sheet disclosures are being
required,1 3 9 and regulators are contemplating some incremental
Business Was Wildly Profitable and Profitably Wild, April 1, 1994, at Al; Jeffrey Taylor,
Broker Recalls Mrs. Clinton's Trading, Denies Her Profit was from Favoritism, WALL ST. J.,
April 11, 1994, at Al16; David L. Brandon, The Mystery of Hillay's Trades, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 7, 1994, at A14; Earl C. Gottschalk Jr., If Hillary Clinton Made Money in Commodi-
ties, Why Can't You? Well, Let's Count the Reasons... ,WALL ST.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at C14.
See generally Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1994, at Al; (potential Supreme
Court nominee made $ 500,000 from commodity futures speculations during 1970s).
Michael Kelly, The President's Past, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,July 31, 1994, at 20, 22 (describing
Hillary Rodham's cattle futures dealings with Clinton friend James Blair that netted a
nearly 10,000 percent return); Tim W. Ferguson, A Commodities Cast That Won't Be
Playing Washington, WALL ST.J.,July 5, 1994, at A13 (discussing prior business dealings
of Robert Lee (Red) Bone, Hillary Rodham Clinton's broker in dealings in cattle
futures); Eric D. Randall, First Lady's Profit Lures Investors to Commodities, U.S.A. TODAY,
July 21, 1994, at 3B (describing the increase in investor activity in commodity markets
after the disclosure that Hillary Rodham Clinton earned $100,000 from a $1,000 in-
vestment in cattle futures).
There have also been politicians in earlier years who have been embarrassed by
commodity speculations. See generally ROBERT J. DONOVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS 349-
50 (1977) (Truman administration charged with using government information to
trade in futures); CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 432
(1991); WAYNE G. BROEHL, JR., CARGILL: TRADING THE WORLD'S GRAIN 657-58 (1992)
(Drew Pearson charges that Senators Happy Chandler from Kentucky, Pappy
O'Daniel of Texas, and Scott Lucas from Illinois, as well as Ed Pauley (a Truman
supporter and former official of the Democratic National Committee) profited from
grain speculations); T.H. WATKINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AMERICA IN THE 1930s 235
(1993) (The radio priest, Father Coughlin, a political threat and irritant to Franklin
Roosevelt, was found to have been speculating in silver futures contracts, apparently
using funds solicited from contributors responding to his radio program); Smith &
Lipin, supra note 1.
137 There are a number of studies being conducted internationally on risks related
to derivatives. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1461 n. 14 (1993).
138 These issues are discussed infra at notes 203-32 and accompanying text.
139 The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a statement on April 15, 1994
that required disclosure of derivative risk and financial reports. This included subjec-
tive descriptions of risk, the strategies for the transaction and other matters. This was
to increase off-balance sheet risk disclosure. Lipin et al., supra note 125, at A7. See
generally CFTC REPORT, supra note 118, Working Paper 4-1. For a world-wide survey of
accounting and regulatory treatment of derivatives, see A Global Survey, FUTURES AND
OPTIONS WORLD DIRECTORY AND REVIEw 37 (1994).
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regulatory requirements. 140  This "incremental" approach also
seems to have won academic approval,"' but a Government Ac-
counting Office Report has suggested that more is needed.14
2
One report was prepared by the CFTC in response to a Con-
gressional directive in the Conference Report to the Futures Trad-
ing Act of 1992.143 It examined the over-the-counter market at
some length and concluded that no greater regulation was
needed. 144 The report, however, appeared to be driven more by
ideology than a serious assessment of the risks portrayed by deriva-
tive instruments. 145 The CFTC has always been a reluctant regula-
140 See Business and Finance, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 1994, at 5 (international regu-
lators issue regulatory guidelines for banks and broker-dealers that deal in derivative
instruments).
141 Hu, supra note 137, at 1464; see also Your Financial Future, THE ECONOMIST, May
14, 1994, at 15. An incremental approach has not been accepted by at least one Con-
gressman. Hansell, Pane4 supra note 9, at D1 (Rep. EdwardJ. Markey: "I am not at all
convinced that voluntarism by the dealers and incremental adjustments of existing
regulation will be sufficient to respond to the new risks created by derivatives.").
142 See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text; see also John Connor, Inquiry
Launched of Derivatives Use By Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J.,July 5, 1994,
at C18 (discussing an inquiry by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
into the sharp increase in the use of derivatives by the Federal National Mortgage
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.).
143 CFTC REPORT, supra note 118. The CFTC was directed by Congress to make this
study to determine if additional regulation was needed. Id. at 1.
144 Id. at 1.
145 As stressed in the CFTC report, and by the agency's former chairman, the risks
to the market are smaller than the large notional amount of outstanding derivative
contract. Id.; Gramm, supra note 119, A12. The often referred to fact that there are
trillions of dollars in outstanding swaps transactions is a reference to the amounts of
the underlying commodity and not to the payment streams that are being swapped.
As noted by Merrill Lynch's financial statements:
notional or contractual amounts of these instruments [derivative instru-
ments] do not represent the Company's exposure to credit risk. Credit
risk arises from the failure of a counterparty to perform according to
the terms of a contract. The Company's exposure to credit risk associ-
ated with swap and forward contracts is limited to the current costs to
replace all contracts in which the Company has a gain. The Company
monitors such exposure and collateral values daily and requires
counterparties to deposit additional collateral when necessary.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Balance
Sheet as of December 31, 1993, at 10.
A Congressional report also stated that:
The notional amount represents the principal balance underlying a de-
rivative agreement. It is the amount .upon which payment to
counterparties are calculated, and functions as the fictitious principal
generating the cash flow in a derivative agreement. The two parties to a
derivative agreement trade the cash flow yield, not the notional amount.
The notional amount is not at risk; typically, only 2-5% of the notional
amount represents credit exposure.
LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. This, however, may not be an insubstantial risk
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tor. For ,the most part, its views are that the markets should
regulate themselves. That argument is not without a great deal of
substance, but that position exposes the financial system to a great
deal of uncertainty that has not generally been tolerated for other
financial instruments.
1 46
Another study was conducted by a Steering Committee of the
Group of Thirty, a private group of major financial institutions
chaired by Paul Volcker. This study expressed the view that
"[d] erivatives by their nature do not introduce risk of a fundamen-
tal difference or of a greater scale than those already present in the
financial market.1 47 The study asserted that "supervisory concerns
can be addressed within the present regulatory structures and
approaches." 4 8
The Group of Thirty study did not seek any fundamental
change in the regulation of derivatives and stated that separate reg-
ulation of derivatives would conflict with existing supervision."4
"There is also a danger in imposing regulatory formulas that in-
hibit new product innovation or discourage firms from developing
the individualized, robust risk management systems on which they
should rely."' 5 ° Instead, the Group of Thirty study sought to "de-
as where a fixed rate obligation is swapped for a variable rate. Experience is also
proving that many derivatives can magnify market risks if not handled properly. The
Metallgesellschaft case is one of the more dramatic cases of such an occurrence. See
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146 The CFTC report did propose a joint task force of the Federal Reserve Board,
the SEC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Papering Over the Cracks,
FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD DIREcToRY & REVIEW, 1994, at 35. The CFTC report fur-
ther stated that its:
central conclusion is that while no fundamental changes in the regula-
tory structure appear to be needed at this time to address issues
presented by the growing use of OTC derivatives, greater coordination
among federal financial regulators would help assure that federal over-
sight remains adequate. Finding that the "systemic and public policy
issues suggested by these products are not confined to any single market
or to the province of any one regulator," the Report recommends the
establishment of an interagency council to consider common ap-
proaches to such issues as market information access, transparency, in-
ternal management controls, and the development of clearing facilities
for OTC derivatives.
CFTC REPORT, supra note 118, at 1.
147 GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 2, at i.
148 Id. The GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT also asserted that derivative activities still re-
main "modest in relation to foreign exchange, bonds, or equities." Id. at 2.
149 Id. The Bank of England found the Group of Thirty report to be "somewhat
complacent." Papering Over the Cracks, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD DIRECTORY & RE-
VIEW, 1994, at 35.
150 GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. The GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT did
note: "Because over-the-counter derivatives are customized transactions, they often
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fine a set of sound risk management practices for dealers and end-
users of derivatives and instruments."' 15
Governmental reports on the derivatives market have been
more alarming in their tone, but they too have vacillated on the
nature and amount of the regulation needed for derivative instru-
ments. A report by the International Monetary Fund expressed the
concern that derivatives are making it harder for regulators to as-
sess the risk of the faults in the system.'- 2 More aggressively, the
Comptroller of the Currency directed banks under his regulatory
supervision to adopt comprehensive risk management systems for
their derivatives trading.' 53 He wants banks using these instru-
ments to anticipate unexpected risks.'54 The Comptroller of the
assemble risks in complex ways. This can make the measurement and control of these
risks more difficult and create the possibility of unexpected loss." Id. at 3. As another
industry official stated: "[d]erivatives are not a high-stakes on the fringes-they are at
the heart of the American economy. To regulate them in the wrong way is to regulate
the economy in the wrong way. No-one wants that." Thomas Russo, Managing Direc-
tor, Lehman Brothers, Inc., Derivatives Regulation: Lessons From the Past and a Pro-
posal for the Future, Address at a luncheon sponsored by the Futures Industry
Institute (Mar. 4, 1994), at 12.
151 GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 3, at i.
The Group of Thirty study sent forth twenty recommendations to help those us-
ing over-the-counter derivatives to manage that activity. Id. at 3. These recommenda-
tions included the following: establishment of risk management policies at the
highest levels of firms on the firms use of derivatives; marking of derivatives at their
market price for risk management purposes; quantification of market risks by stimula-
tions and forecasting; assessment of credit risks from counterparties; reduction of
credit risk by master agreements that have netting provisions; establishment of market
and credit risk management functions; employment of professionals to manage deriv-
ative risks; establishment of management information systems; and adoption of ac-
counting and disclosure practices with greater transparency, Id. at 7-8. The Group of
Thirty Study concluded that governmental efforts should focus on clarifying legal un-
certainties and in "resolving legal inconsistencies between countries that may impede
risk-reduction procedures. . . ." Id. at i.
152 Patrick Harverson, Regulation, Temperature Has Cooled Markedly, FIN. TIMEs (Sur-
vey), Oct. 20, 1993, at VIII.
153 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management of Financial Deriva-
tives, Banking Circular No. 277 (Oct. 27, 1993).
The concern with bank activities in the derivatives market may bejustified: "The
three biggest players in the derivatives game are New York banks - Chemical Bank,
Bankers Trust, and Citicorp. Together, these three banks are into this market for over
$6 trillion; Chemical Bank alone is in for $2.5 trillion. All of these banks have Federal
deposit insurance." 140 CONG. REc. S5828-04, S5837 (statement of Rep. Dorgan
1994).
154 Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S. Announces Some Guidelines for Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 28, 1993, at C13.
The Federal Reserve Board advised its supervisory officials that bank examina-
tions should include a determination of the bank maintains written policies and pro-
cedures concerning the institution's risk management procedures for derivative
activities. Bank examiners have also been directed to review internal control and au-
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Currency also required these banks to ensure that the derivative
products they were selling were appropriate for their customers.1 55
Ajoint policy statement issued on March 15, 1994 by the SEC,
CFTC, and England's Security and Investment Board ("SIB") ex-
pressed a desire for more information on the derivative activities of
the firms they regulate, tighter management controls, and "pru-
dent risk based capital."156 It is unclear what the latter means, but
concerns have been expressed that this may mean large amounts of
capital if the SEC is left to determine the amount.1 57
The number of reports on derivative instruments continue to
dit procedures for derivatives, to determine whether senior management of the bank
is evaluating regularly the procedures to manage risk of derivative instruments and
whether management control is independent of those conducting trading activities.
In addition, banks supervised by the Federal Reserve Board are to conduct stress tests
on their derivatives, risk taking guidelines should be implemented, reporting systems
should be in place, credit risks should be assessed, credit limits imposed, liquidity
risks should be managed and internal controls and audits should be in place. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Memorandum to the Officer in Charge
of Supervision of Each Federal Reserve Bank, SR93-69 (FIS), Examining Risk Manage-
ment and Internal Controls for Trading Activities of Banking Organizations (Dec. 20,
1993).
155 Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S. Issues Guidelines on 'Derivatives' Obliging Banks to Mull
Customer Needs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at A24 [hereinafter Bacon, US. Issues Guide-
lines]. The Comptroller of the Currency required banks to make sure that they under-
stood and could monitor and control derivative risks. Banks were required to
understand the risks associated with the derivatives transactions in which they are
engaged. Id.
The Comptroller of the Currency also issued a twenty-three page circular on May
10, 1994 that further described the responsibilities of banks engaged in derivatives
transactions. Kenneth H. Bacon, Derivatives Rule Being Widened By Comptroller, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 1994, at A2 [hereinafter Bacon, Derivatives Rule]. This circular was
designed to answer questions raised by the prior circular on this subject. Of particu-
lar concern to the banks was the scope of the requirement for determining the appro-
priateness of derivatives for bank customers. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Questions and Answers for Banking Circular 277, OCC Bulletin (OCC 94-
31) (May 10, 1994); Keith Bradsher, Banks Are Warned on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1994, at D14 (Treasury Department official's warning to the banking industry con-
cerning derivatives, the risks they pose and the difficulty in assessing those risks).
The banks have increasingly been expanding their operations and adding to
their profits through trading activities in capital market operations. These changes
have been described as "dramatic." Chemical Bank, for example, reported revenues
of $1 billion in 1993 that were based on trading revenues rather than lending. The
Bank of America had more profits from trading in capital markets than from lending.
When to Throw 'era Back, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 81, 82. Bankers Trust has
become the largest derivatives dealer. In 1993, over 50 percent of its revenue was
derivatives (some $600 million), but in the fourth quarter of 1994, it lost some $49
million from its trading activities. Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust Faces Review of Credit
RatingBy S.&.P., N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at CI; Lipin et al., supra note 125, at Al, A7.
156 OTC Derivatives Oversight, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,003 (Mar. 15, 1994).
157 Out of Tune, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 97. For a discussion of capital
requirement issues, see infra notes 210-32 and accompanying text.
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grow. There has been a Promisel Report (a working group study
commissioned by the Governors of the Central Banks of the Group
of Ten Countries), a report by The Bank of England and the Insti-
tute of International Finance, and a task force was established by
senior bank managers from European,Japanese, and United States
banks at the Institute of International Finance.15 s
An aggressive and massive report was prepared at the behest
of Representative James A. Leach by the minority staff of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.1 59 This report
contained some thirty recommendations for the imposition of
strengthened regulatory standards. Among other things, these rec-
ommendations sought a strong capital requirement to guard
against risks posed by derivative instruments,16 ° greater coordina-
tion among regulatory authorities to assure comparable regulatory
standards, enhancement of disclosure standards for firms using de-
rivative instruments, and requirements for specific written policies
on risk standards that would be approved by the boards of direc-
tors of these firms.161 Another recommendation sought to discour-
age insured financial institutions from engaging in derivative
activities unless they could demonstrate sufficient sophistication
and capital to withstand the risks of that trading. 62
Several regulatory bodies also responded to inquires from the
Leach Committee. They expressed the view that the growth and
complexity of derivative instruments require monitoring, examina-
tion, and supervision and that they should receive the highest regu-
latory priority. The agencies acknowledged that significant
benefits were being received from derivatives, but they also were of
the view that these instruments should be limited to sophisticated
158 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 45-47. See also INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES MARKETS, PRODUCTS AND FINAN-
CIAL INTERMEDIARIES (June 1990) (describing various models or approaches to the
regulation of derivatives markets).
159 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3.
160 Capital requirements are discussed infra at notes 209-31 and accompanying text.
161 Letter from James A. Leach, Ranking Member, House Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs to Banking Committee Colleagues, Nov. 22, 1993 (enclo-
sure entitled: Recommendations for Stronger Regulatory Standards).
162 Id. Many of the Leach Report recommendations were directed at the derivative
activities of insured financial institutions. Id. .Interestingly, the report also recom-
mended that:
The U.S. Treasury should evaluate the benefits of utilizing derivative
instruments for hedging purposes to improve the efficiency of govern-
ment financial management practices. Sovereigns around the world use
derivatives for financial risk management purposes.
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financial institutions. Regulators wanted to be sure that the capi-
tal, expertise, and operating procedures of firms using these instru-
ments are maintained at appropriate levels. The agencies did not,
however, believe that it was necessary to change the current regula-
tory framework. 163 Still, regulatory proposals continue to surface
because the risks posed by derivatives are substantial.1 64
The regulators are slowly awakening to the fact that derivative
instruments are now posing a threat to the financial system, if for
no other reason than their size alone. There has been a fear ex-
pressed by certain regulators and commentators that the failure of
a major derivatives participant could send shock waves throughout
the financial system as a whole. This threat of single "systemic risk
has been raised by some like a banner in battle for more laws and
more regulation."' 65 The SEC is actively considering what new reg-
ulations are needed for the firms it oversees. The SEC has also
been placing pressure on firms it regulates to present more finan-
cial information about their derivative trading activities. 166
The SEC's efforts were given a boost by the General Account-
163 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 50.
164 See, e.g., Taking Stock of Risk, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 7; see also CFTC
News Feature, Aug. 1994, at 2 (discussing a paper issued by the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions' Technical Committee guiding regulators "on a
framework of managment control mechanisms" for firms engaged in over-the-counter
derivatives activities).
165 Russo, supra note 150. "Systemic risk is the risk that a disruption by any partici-
pant or group of participants causes widespread difficulties at other firms, in other
segments, or in the financial system as a whole." LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
166 New Disclosure Rules Sought for Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at C8. See also
John Connor & Stephen Power, Markey Bill Would Give SEC Oversight Over Unregulated
Derivatives Dealers, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, at C22 (discussing SEC negotiations with
six of the nation's largest securities firms to set voluntary standards on their deriva-
tives sales and trading practices); Jeffrey Taylor & Steven Lipin, SEC, Six Firms Work to
Set Derivatives Rules, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at C1 (same).
See generally Richard Waters, SEC Scrutinises Use of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, May 25,
1994, at 17. Most derivative instruments had been "off balance sheet" items that were
only mentioned in footnotes to the financial statements of firms dealing in deriva-
tives. The footnote material provided very little data as to the amount of risk or prof-
its and losses from those instruments. It was at the urging of the SEC that firms
engaging in derivative transactions have disclosed their profits and losses from that
activity. This still presents a limited window, because not all institutions are disclosing
complete information, but it certainly is revealing to the extent that brokerage firms
and other financial institutions are engaging in derivative trading. See Michael Sico-
nolfi, supra note 135, at A10.
Oddly, the SEC's own massive study of the future of the securities markets re-
served comment on the derivatives market and their regulation. SEC Division of Mar-
ket Regulation, Market 2000 Report: An Examination of Current Equity Market
Developments (Jan. 1994); SEC Statement on and Excerpts from the Division of Market Reg-
ulation's Market 2000 Report (BNA) (Jan. 27, 1994).
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ing Office ("GAO") which prepared a report that sought increased
regulation of broker-dealers, their affiliates, insurance companies,
and other firms that deal in derivatives and which are not regu-
lated by the banking authorities. 167 The GAO Report stated that
there is an immediate need "for Congress to bring the currently
unregulated OTC derivatives activities of securities firm and insur-
ance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the
existing federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives
regulation is consistent and comprehensive across regulatory agen-
cies." "" The GAO Report also recommended that regulators de-
velop centralized information on the extent of over-the-counter
dealer's counterparty concentrations and derivatives earnings, and
that they develop a consistent set of capital standards for deriva-
tives and establish requirements for internal controls for derivative
dealers. 16
9
V. REGULATORY ACTION IS NEEDED
There are numerous proposals for the regulation of deriva-
tives that range from creating a new regulatory commission to the
imposition of SEC regulations.'7 They all suffer, however, from a
lack of consensus on the appropriate regulatory model to apply.
There is a reason for this disharmony. Most of the dealers and end
users in this market are financial institutions that traditionally have
been subjected to less intensive regulation than broker-dealers in
their dealings with public customers. The SEC and the CFTC have
also been turning away from applying the full panoply of their pow-
ers to institutional investors. For example, "accredited" investors
(institutions and wealthy individuals) are exempted by SEC Regula-
167 Richard Waters & Patrick Harverson, US Derivatives Probe Urged, FIN. TIMES, May
19, 1994, at 1; Saul Hansell, Report on Derivatives Said To Seek New S.E.C. Power, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1994, at Cl; Steven Lipin, GAO Report Urges Controls For Derivatives, WALL
ST. J., May 5, 1994, at C1. The GAO proposals have met almost universal industry
opposition, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has disagreed with its
conclusions. Hansell, Key Supporter, supra note 9, at C1, C5; John Capper, Callfor New
Swap and Option Curbs Rejected, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 1994, at 5; Generally Against Options,
THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 1994, at 87.
168 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 14 (May 1994).
169 Id. at 15-16. The GAO Report also somewhat expansively recommended that
Congress "address the need to revamp and modernize the entire U.S. financial regu-
latory system." Id. at 15.
170 Representative Leach has proposed a new Federal Derivatives Commission. The
Commission would set policy and the SEC and CFTC and banking regulators would
enforce the new legislation, if it were enacted. Russo, supra note 150.
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tion D"7 ' from certain of the requirements of the federal securities
laws. The private placement exemption in the Securities Act of
1933172 also exempts many institutional transactions from the pro-
spectus and other requirements of that statute.1 73 Consequently,
protection of institutions in their financial dealings is generally
limited to common law style protections from fraud and breach of
contract. The theory is that institutions have the sophistication
and wherewithal to protect themselves. They do not need the elab-
orate prospectus requirements and other customer protections
available to retail customers in the securities industry.
The growth of derivatives has led some to question whether
these assumptions for institutional investors are correct. Those
questions need to be answered. The securities and futures markets
are no longer dominated by individual investors. There has been a
gradual shift to dominance by the institutions.17 4 Consequently, we
are at a crossroads on the proper course for the future regulation
of these markets. The growth of derivatives is now forcing the issue
on what fork to take.
Certainly, an exchange trading requirement such as that con-
tained in the Commodity Exchange Act is not appropriate. That
would simply stifle an innovative and economically valuable mar-
ket. Similarly, the SEC style regulation for broker-dealers that deal
with the public seems unnecessary. 75 Institutional investors simply
do not need such a protective and expensive regulatory shield.
They have the ability to manage their own risks. A different regula-
tory model, therefore, appears appropriate.
A model that would properly weigh the unique nature of the
institutional investor, but at the same time guard against a financial
"meltdown" would include the following elements: a designated
regulator, a definition of the instruments to be regulated, regis-
171 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-230.506 (1993).
172 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
173 The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 also authorized the CFTC to exempt
institutions from the exchange trading requirement. See supra notes 82-84 and accom-
panying text.
174 Individual investors decreased their direct stock holdings between 1985 and
1990 by more than one third. Individual stock ownership fell from 84 percent of hold-
ings in 1965 to about 53 percent in 1991. William Power, Small Investor Continues to
Give Up Control of Stock, WALL ST.J., May 11, 1992, at C1. More telling, in 1990, fewer
than twenty percent of trades were being conducted by individuals. U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BuLLs AND BEARs: U.S. SECURITIES
MARKETS AND INFORMATIxON TECHNOLOGY 7 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC
BuLLs AND BES].
175 For a description of that regulatory system, see DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER
REGULAT ION (1990).
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tration of dealers, large trader reports, and a risk based capital or
other methodology for guarding against excessive exposure from
the leverage available from derivatives. The regulatory structure
should also contain some mechanism for assuring that firms deal-
ing in derivatives have adequate internal monitoring and account-
ing controls. Each of these elements are discussed below.
A. Defining the Derivative and Registration of Dealers
The "kingpin" of any effective regulatory structure is a registra-
tion requirement for the dealers in the market. 76 This registration
requirement identifies the dealers to the regulator. The regulator
can then screen out irresponsible firms and impose substantive
regulation on the firms that meet minimum entry requirements.
This is not a radical step. Similar requirements were imposed by
the Government Securities Act of 1986 for an equally important
market. 1
7 7
Moreover, as a former CFTC chairman notes, more than
ninety percent of the top fifty entities dealing in interest rate swaps
are banks, financial firms, or their affiliates that are already subject
to regulation. 7 Therefore, a registration requirement should not
be too unduly burdensome. The SEC is also already regulating the
activities of affiliates of the firms they regulate through risk disclo-
sure and internal controls requirements. 179 The CFTC is consider-
ing similar requirements.18 0
176 See, e.g., Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1988); Maloley v. R.J.
O'Brien & Assoc., Inc, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,012 (C.F.T.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 23,625 (8th Cir. 1987); Regional Properties v. Fin. & Real Estate
Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982); Eastside Church of Christ v. National
Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968).
177 An Undersecretary of the Treasury has proposed a derivatives model for regula-
tion based on the Government Securities Act. Russo, supra note 150, at 10.
178 Gramm, supra note 119, at A12. The former Chairman, however, opposes addi-
tional regulation. Id.
179 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17-iT, 17h-2T (1993). The SEC's rules require the broker-
dealer to establish and maintain policies for monitoring and controlling the financial
and operational risks to it from the activities of affiliates. 17 C.F.R. 17h-lT(a) (1993).
These rules were proposed after the failure of Drexel Burnham and pursuant to au-
thority in the Market Reform Act of 1990. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-29,635
(Aug. 30, 1991); Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,929 (July 16, 1992). The SEC's
Chairman has stated that this is sufficient authority for it to regulate the activities of
broker-dealer affiliates, but he also indicated that this authority does require the affili-
ates to submit to SEC examination. Hansell, Key Supporter, supra note 9, at CI, C5.
180 The CFTC proposal requires access by it to information concerning affiliates
that might have a material effect on the futures commission merchants registered
with the CFTC. 59 Fed. Reg. 9689 (Mar. 1, 1994). Those records also concern the
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The application of the registration requirement is, nonethe-
less, really a three-step process. First, the instruments for which
dealing in will require registration require definition. This will be
a relatively straightforward process for garden variety swaps and
other now more traditional derivatives. There are, however, an
ever increasing number and variations of derivatives that will re-
quire the regulatory agency to define the instruments to be regu-
lated.' There will also be some harsh political concerns, such as
whether to include the interbank currency market within the defi-
nition. Heretofore, that market has only been loosely regulated by
the banking authorities.
18 2
The second step will be to define the dealers that will need to
register. This will include at least the banks and securities affiliates
who are now the principal dealers in the derivatives market. The
dealers required to be registered should be distinguished from the
end users of the products, who are the beneficiaries of this regula-
tory scheme. That distinction may not be easy since end users may
be heavily involved in the market and have some characteristics of
a dealer. One approach would be to define the end user as some-
one that is hedging or engaging in derivatives for investment only.
The third step in the registration process will be to identify the
regulator with whom registration is required. The Government Se-
curities Act of 1986 provides a useful model. Affiliates of broker-
dealers could register with the SEC and be subject to its require-
ments, while banks could file notices with their regulators. The
adoption and enforcement of regulations could also be shared by
the regulators, as is the case under the Government Securities
Act. 183
risk management policies and information on the derivative and other activities of
affiliates.
181 Over 1200 derivative instruments have been identified to date. Berton, supra
note 4, at C12.
182 The European Union Parliament is considering a tax on speculative transac-
tions in the foreign exchange markets as the result of large scale speculations by
George Soros and others that disrupted the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
140 CONG. REc. H2202-01, H2205 (1994) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); 139 CONG.
REc. H3821-04, H3824-25 (1994) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); Christian Tyler, Pri-
vate View: The Man who Broke the Bank of England, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1994, at 16; Fried-
man, supra note 127, at D1, D6.
183 Self-regulatory bodies such as the NASD or a body such as the Municipal Securi-
ties Rulemaking Board could also play a significant role. See supra note 115 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the role of self-regulation see e.g., Sam Scott
Miller, Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry: Does Membership Have Its
Privileges? 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1992); Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities
Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853 (1985).
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B. Substantive Regulation
An assessment of the risks associated with derivatives must be
made in order to determine what substantive regulations are
needed for end users and derivative dealers. The risks posed by
derivative instruments can be grouped into two large categories-
product risk and counterparty risk.18 4 Each of those risks pose par-
ticular regulatory concerns.
Product risk can come in infinite varieties, depending on the
nature of the particular derivative product. Product risk most
often turns on the leverage that most derivative instruments pro-
vide in one form or another.185 Concerns continue to grow that
184 One author has noted that the two most important risks associated with deriva-
tives in the over-the-counter market are credit risks and market risks. The market risk
is identified as "the risk that interest rates or other market factors will move ad-
versely." Hu, supra note 137, at 1468. This might be better defined as product risk
because market risk will behave differently with different instruments. For example, a
put option sold by a firm can cause severe losses when the market goes down dramati-
cally, while a short futures contract would provide a profit to the seller under the
same circumstances. In any event, the elements of market risk include the delta risk,
gamma risk, vega risk, beta risk, basis risk, correlation risk, and rho risk. These risks
respectively concern changes in the value of the portfolio due to changes in the un-
derlying instruments, changes in the value of the portfolio due to changes in the
implied volatility of the underlying instruments, changes in value as a result of passage
of time because of the time value associated with derivative instruments, and changes
in value of a portfolio due to interest rate changes used to discount future cash flow.
GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT (Appendix 1), supra note 2, at 9.
185 A small amount of capital invested in such an instrument allows the investor to
profit or lose from price changes in a large notional amount of the underlying com-
modity. A large adverse price move can result in large losses that very quickly exceed
the initial investment. Generally, however, end user institutions are hedging in some
form or another. This means that the firm will have a position that will offset any gain
or loss on the derivative transaction.
A good illustration of hedging is found in the function served by the futures
markets. To illustrate, in conformance with modern portfolio theory, institutional
investors may trade diversified stock portfolios whose value will reflect changes in the
overall stock market, as exemplified by the S&P stock index or another index. See
generally American Pension Funds Indexing Fingered, THE ECONOMISr, Apr. 30, 1994, at 84,
87. If the portfolio manager's pricing models suggest that there will be a stock market
correction, the value of the portfolio will be reduced accordingly. The portfolio man-
ager could sell the entire portfolio and avoid that loss. But this would be expensive in
transactional costs. It could also cause adverse tax or other consequences, particularly
if the portfolio manager will buy back these stocks to reinvest the proceeds of the sales
after the market corrections. The portfolio manager can avoid those problems by
simply selling S&P futures contracts or engaging in an equity swap for the value of the
portfolio. In the event the value of the portfolio diminished, the proceeds from the
futures contract or swap would offset the reduction in the value of the portfolio from
the anticipated market correction. If the portfolio manager was wrong, however, and
the stock market index (and the portfolio itself) actually increased rather than de-
clined as anticipated, then the portfolio will have lost the value of the increase be-
cause the value reflected by that increase would be paid out on the futures contract or
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the management of the firms trading these instruments do not al-
ways understand their risks.'8 6 As set forth above, that concern is
sometimes supported by actual instances of serious losses.' In
fact, a survey of companies using derivative instruments indicated
that much of the financial management of those firms, and most of
the board of directors, did not understand derivatives risk."8
swap. The futures contract or swap, therefore, is simply acting as insurance to guaran-
tee the present value of the portfolio.
Derivatives may also be used as "anticipatory" hedges. To illustrate, a corporate
treasurer plans to borrow a large sum of money in sixty days. He anticipates, however,
that rates will rise steeply before the loan is taken down. He would like to lock in
today's rate for this long term loan. He could do this by immediately borrowing the
funds, but this is expensive and may not be possible for any number of practical rea-
sons. Alternatively, the treasure could enter into a futures contract or an over-the-
counter interest rate "ceiling" that will effectively cap his interest rates at today's
levels. There will be a cost to this, but that is the insurance premium to be paid for
locking in the rate.
Where a derivatives end user is hedging, the derivative instrument is merely act-
ing as a form of insurance. A premium will be paid for the insurance that hedging
provides. The hedger will have financing costs for margin calls, option premiums or
derivative transactions fees or commissions. These costs may be significant. The value
of a futures style hedge may also be lost if margin funds are not available, and losses
may even result. Losses may also occur because of differences in the commodity be-
ing hedged and the commodity underlying the derivative instrument, causing pricing
disparities. See generally Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp.
486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (large losses experienced by an entity that was speculating in-
stead of hedging).
Unfortunately, if a hedge is not properly placed, large losses can still result, as
exemplified by the Metallgesellschaft debacle. The United States unit of Metallgesell-
schaft A.G. was allowed to trade in extremely large quantities of futures contracts
because it was purportedly hedging its physical commitments, and it had huge over-
the-counter derivatives obligations as well. These commitments were not properly
matched with its physical commitments. Instead of insuring against losses from price
changes, the result was a staggering loss. Taylor & Sullivan, supra note 120, at C14;
Taylor & Bacon, supra note 120, at Cl.
186 See generally Taming the Treasurer, THE ECONOMis'r, June 4, 1994, at 15.
187 See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
188 Lipin et al., supra note 125, at Al.
A subset of product risk is legal risk, which may be the greatest danger so far
from derivative instruments, as exemplified by a United Kingdom case in which mu-
nicipal authorities were found not to have had the authority to enter into swap con-
tracts and concerns with the exchange trading requirement in the Commodity
Exchange Act. See LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11.
A Congressional report also identified several forms of product risk from deriva-
tives instruments including settlement risks, market risks, operating risks, market li-
quidity risks, aggregation, and interconnection risks. Id. at 7-13. Settlement risks
occur where a firm pays for delivery before receipt of assets or payments from a
counterparty. Id. at 9. Operating risks arise where there are inadequate internal con-
trols, system failures or fraud. Id. at 9. Market liquidity risks arise where an instru-
ment cannot be sold or replaced quickly close to its fundamental values. Id. at 10.
The Group of Thirty identified the following risks related to derivative transac-
tions: market liquidity, as where a large transaction has an effect on the price of the
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The counterparty risk is a more individualized problem. This
risk simply involves the issue of whether the party opposite an over-
the-counter derivative instrument will perform on the contract.1 89
Credit controls such as those used for lending, futures trading, and
other credit activities have, to date, limited losses from this risk.19 0
Nevertheless, there are concerns that a large default by a large
trader could impose substantial losses.' 9 '
Each of these risks-product and counterparty-raises differ-
ent regulatory concerns. Each requires different regulatory ap-
proaches for dealers and end users. For product risks, internal
controls, record keeping, accounting standards, and large trader
instrument; basis or correlation risks between a derivative instrument and the under-
lying instrument; investing and funding risks from cash flow mismatches; credit risks
of counterparties; credit risks of the individual instrument where there is a default
and the instrument has to be replaced; settlement risks where the delivery of the
security and the delivery of the payment are not synchronized; operational risks
where there are inadequate control systems or accounting systems; and legal risks as
to the validity of the derivative contract that is in place. GRouP OF THIRTY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 44-52.
189 "The credit risk arising from derivatives is the same credit risk that banks face in
their normal function of extending loans. The evaluation of credit risks in a deriva-
tive transaction is typically the same as that which is used to analyze the credit risk
associated with making loans." LEACH REPORT (PART 2), supra note 3, at 40-41.
190 Derivative instruments are also being developed to deal with credit risk. Laurie
Morse, Risk and Reward, Fresh Challenge for Users of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 1994,
at 21.
191 The counterparty risk has become a marketing tool for the larger firms dealing
in derivatives. A highly rated credit classification provides comfort to those with
whom they are dealing and makes their instruments more attractive than those of-
fered by their competitors. William B. Crawford, Jr. In Swaption World It Has To Be
AAA, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1994, at C1; Ann Schwimmer, Lehman's Simple Solutions Solves
Swaps Sub Quandary, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEsT, Feb. 14, 1994, at 10.
One recent joint venture in derivatives was mandated because of the need for
capital. Lazard Freres did not have sufficient capital for such a venture and it there-
fore enlisted Credit Agricole of France. Under their joint venture, Lazard's exposure
was to be limited to its capital contribution, but Credit Agricole was required to stand
behind all the derivative transactions of the firm. "As a result, one of its chief contri-
butions to the venture will be financial executives who will monitor risk." Saul Han-
sell, Lazard Finds Brawny Ally For Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at DI.
Brokerage firms have sought to isolate their derivative activities from their securi-
ties regulated operations through the creation of separate affiliates, but they have had
to heavily capitalize -them to assure a top credit rating. See infra note 203. Salomon
Bros., for example, reportedly put up one hundred and seventy five million dollars to
fund its swap unit. Mayer, supra note 119, at A18.
The derivative product subsidiaries that have been created include Merrill Lynch
Derivative Products, Inc., GS Financial Products International, L.P. Goldman Sachs,
and Swapco Salomon Brothers. LEACH REPORT (PART II), supra note 3, at 41. Banque
Paribas has formed its own subsidiary BPC and several insurance companies have sub-
sidiaries such as AIG financial products and General RE Financial Products Corpora-
tion. Id. The banks have been prevented from setting up their separate swap units
for their transactions. Mayer, supra note 119, at A18.
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reports will form the basis for regulation. Credit controls, net capi-
tal, and other considerations will determine the appropriate regu-
lation for counterparty risks.:.
VI. REGULATING PRODUCT AND COUNTERPARTY RISKS-THE
DEALERS
The basic prerequisite for any effective system of controls for
product risks from derivative instruments are recognition and ac-
counting. A firm that is trading derivative instruments must be
able to recognize the risks they pose (counterparty and product
risks), and the firm must be able to account in an orderly manner
for those transactions. Both of these requirements are
intertwined. 19 2
The accounting system of a firm dealing in derivatives must
not only be able to book the transactions, it must also provide
enough information to assess their risk. This means that the ac-
counting records of the firm should reflect the amount of out-
standing obligations, their nature, and there must be some
mechanism for assessing the risk that they pose to the firm in the
event of adverse events. For example, in the Metallgesellschaft
case, the firm was undoubtedly unaware of the number of transac-
tions on its books and their nature.' 93 It failed, however, to assess
the risks of offsetting short-term futures obligations with longer
term derivative instruments. The basis differences between those
two instruments took an unexpected course as the price of oil
dropped. This resulted in losses that accumulated at a rapid rate,
eventually reaching some $1.37 billion. 194
An effective accounting system must, therefore, document
transactions and assign some risk factor to them. The latter is a
difficult exercise. Nevertheless, option pricing models have been
developed to assess the risk from engaging in many derivative
transactions. These models make some basic assumptions as to
dangers posed by the instrument and allow the trader to determine
the proper method of coverage.
Of course, danger still lurks here because the assumptions may
not be correct.195 To be effective, the accounting system must de-
192 The creation of a derivative dealer is no small task. One dealer had four units
which included "a quantitative analysis and research group, an equity group, taxable
fixed-income, and municipal derivatives." Jessica Sommar, Derivatives Group Formed in
Smith Barney Shake-up, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, June 14, 1993, at 7.
193 See supra note 120.
194 Id.
195 For a discussion of pricing models and some of their flaws, see Hu, supra note
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velop a derivative pricing model that realistically assesses risk. That
model must be constantly updated to reflect changing market con-
ditions. In areas where standardization is occurring, such models
may be developed on an industry wide basis; although an industry
model can compound errors in assumptions.196
Dealers must also have an effective system of internal controls
to assess and control risks once they are identified in the account-
ing and reporting systems of the firms. The bank regulatory au-
thorities have already acted to require banks dealing in derivatives
to establish internal systems of controls. For example, the Federal
Reserve Board ('the Fed') issued a circular that requires its exam-
iners to examine the internal controls of banks.197 The Fed is also
field testing a manual that evaluates a bank's risk management pro-
cess. Those procedures seem adequate to assure proper controls.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has also established
similar requirements for the banks it supervises. 198
The supervision requirements imposed by the banking author-
137, at 1478. This author notes that theoretical models all depend upon unrealistic
assumptions. Id. He also notes that product complexity will reduce the efficiency of
risk models. Id. at 1479; see also Emerging-Market Options More a Shrub Than a Hedge,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 88 (discussing risks posed by option pricing models
and the hedge ratios they use).
196 In the absence of industry models, the cost of risk assessment can be high. Fi-
nancial specialists will be required and a great deal of management time may be re-
quired to be devoted to this area, particularly if management is unfamiliar with these
instruments. Industry models could be constantly updated and would be subject to
industry-wide criticism if they are not properly reflecting the risk of particular transac-
tions. The danger, of course, is that a herd instinct will prevail and large unforeseen
risks may be overlooked or built in on an industry-wide basis. This could compound
losses in the industry. Individual models could hopefully reduce that danger by pro-
viding more eyes to the same problem and diversify assumptions, but it is questiona-
ble whether the costs would be worth that additional benefit. In any event, an
industry-wide pricing model would at least account for some of the more obvious risks
and, hopefully, for some of the less obvious.
An additional problem with industry-wide models is that many derivative prod-
ucts are specifically crafted for unique situations that might not lend themselves to
modeling.
197 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Memorandum to The Of-
ficer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank, Examining Risk Manage-
ment and Internal Controls for Trading Activities of Banking Organizations, SR 93-69 (FIS)
(Dec. 20, 1993).
198 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has indicated that he may seek further restrictions on derivative products being
sold by nationally chartered banks. These include limits on such investments, particu-
larly proprietary trades. Karr, supra note 4, at A3. The Comptroller of the Currency
found that there were some six nationally chartered banks that were engaging in spec-
ulative trading operations. He also stated that banks accounted for some $12 trillion
of the $14 trillion market in derivatives in the United States. Keith Bradsher, Banks'
Securities Trading Makes ComptrollerFearfu4 N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1994, at DI. There are
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ities should be extended to broker-dealer affiliates and other new
registrants under the regulatory scheme proposed by this article.
The SEC can also extend its accounting and reporting require-
ments for broker-dealers directly to affiliates and to otherwise un-
regulated dealers to further assure the adequacy of the affiliate's
controls. 199 The audit required by SEC Rule 17a-520 1 for broker-
dealers must be conducted in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and must include a review of the broker-dealer's
accounting system and its internal accounting controls and proce-
dures for safeguarding securities.2 °1
A central component of a regulatory scheme will undoubtedly
be capital requirements. The central issue of the regulatory
scheme will be the form of such requirements. Banks and broker-
dealers have existing capital requirements, but those requirements
may not be appropriate for many derivative activities.20 2 Net capi
some 362 banks involved in derivative transactions. Saul Hansell, Derivatives Get a Key
Supporter, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at DI.
199 For a discussion of the SEC's affiliate rules, see supra notes 179-84.
200 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-5 (1993).
201 The Rule 17a-5 audit requirement was revised in 1965 to emphasize that the
purpose of an audit was to enable the accountant to express an opinion on the effec-
tiveness of internal control procedures. Exchange Act Release No. 7683, 1965 SEC
LEXIS 724 (Aug. 23, 1965). The audit must be conducted in a manner that will iden-
tify, among other things, any material inadequacies in the accounting system of the
broker-dealer, its internal accounting controls or in its procedures for meeting the
possession and control requirements of Rule 15c3-3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g) (1)
(1993). A material inadequacy in the accounting system of a broker-dealer or its
other procedures would include any condition that could inhibit a broker-dealer
from promptly completing securities transactions or meeting responsibilities to cus-
tomers or creditors, result in material financial loss, result in material misstatement of
the broker-dealer's financial statements or result in violations of SEC record keeping
or financial responsibility requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g)(3) (1993).
Where an auditor discovers a material inadequacy in the accounting system of
broker-dealer or its internal accounting control procedures for safeguarding securi-
ties, the auditor is to call the deficiency to the attention to the chief financial officer
of the broker-dealer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(h) (2) (1993). The chief financial officer
has the responsibility to inform the SEC and the broker-dealer's examining authority
of this deficiency by telegraphing notice within twenty-four hours. Id. The broker-
dealer must also supply the accountant with a copy of this notice. If the accountant
fails to receive a copy of the notice within twenty-four hours, it must itself advise the
SEC of the deficiency. Id. If it disagrees with the statements contained in the broker-
dealer's notice, the accountant must also advise the SEC and the broker-dealer's
designating examining authority within twenty four hours. Id.
202 "To avoid the SEC's net capital requirements for swaps, a number of securities
firms have created affiliates to handle their derivatives positions." The SEC, however,
can require them to disclose information about their affiliates. The SEC has begun to
require such information. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at
21.
This is not to suggest that these affiliates are undercapitalized. To the contrary, a
triple A credit rating is an essential part of becoming a swap and OTC derivative
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
tal rules would have to be extended to the presently unregulated
dealers, including the affiliates of broker-dealers. °3
The SEC's net capital rule seeks to assure "that broker-dealers
maintain sufficient liquid assets to satisfy promptly the claims of
customers and broker-dealers, and to provide a cushion of liquid
assets in excess of liabilities to cover potential market and credit
risks. '20 4 The net capital rule "tests both financial strength and li-
quidity."2°5 It is "the principal regulatory tool by which the Com-
mission and the exchanges monitor the financial health of
dealer. Many smaller firms have been taken over by major firms or major firms have
created subsidiaries with AAA credit ratings in order to facilitate this business. Craw-
ford, supra note 191, at Cl; Schwimmer, supra note 191, at 10.
203 The SEC has all ready had some experience with financial activities of unregu-
lated affiliates that can endanger a regulated broker-dealer. The liquidation of
Drexel Burnham after its regulatory troubles required the joint efforts of the New
York Federal Reserve Bank, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve
Board, the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC. Although they facilitated the
liquidation and transfer of Drexel's customer accounts without loss, the collapse of
Drexel Burnham led to much concern as to the adequacy of the regulation of broker-
dealers. ELECTRONic BuLns AND BEARS, supra note 174, at 116. It was found that the
activities of the Drexel's parent company and affiliates, over which the SEC did not
have regulatory control, caused Drexel Burnham's failure. Id. at 115. The parent
company of Drexel had to drain off excess capital of its regulated affiliates because it
was having difficulty obtaining short term financing as a result of its many regulatory
troubles and market conditions. The SEC stated that:
Drexel had over $1 billion in commercial paper and other unsecured
short term borrowings. Unsecured borrowing, particularly through the
commercial paper market, is a common financing technique used by
many large broker-dealer holding companies. As a result significant
losses and a decline in the rating of its commercial paper, Drexel found
it more difficult to renew its short-term borrowings. Drexel was then
forced to look to the liquid sources of capital in its assets-the excess of
net capital of DBL and an affiliated government securities dealers.
Exchange Act Release No. 34-28347 (Aug. 15, 1990).
Drexel moved over two hundred million dollars to the holding company without
the knowledge of the New York Stock Exchange or the SEC. Id. When the SEC
learned of Drexel's financial plight, that firm had more than $400 million in short
term liabilities coming due within two weeks and an additional $330 million sched-
uled to mature in the following month. Id. After the failure of Drexel Burnham, the
SEC moved to amend its net capital rule to prohibit broker-dealers from withdrawing
capital to benefit affiliates or parent companies where such withdrawals would be
detrimental to the integrity of the broker-dealer. Id. The SEC's proposals established
a new early warning level that would preclude capital withdrawals by affiliates without
notice to the SEC or where the withdrawal would endanger the broker-dealer.
204 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DMISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE
OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 5-1, 4-72 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1987 CRASH REPORT].
"The rule helps promote the financial viability of, and public confidence in, the secur-
ities industry by protecting both customers and other broker-dealers from risks and
exposures in the broker-dealer." Id.
205 SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed and Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 856 (S.D.
Cal. 1960).
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brokerage firms and protect customers from the risk involved in
leaving their cash and securities with broker-dealers."" 6
206 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570 (1979) (footnote omitted).
The net capital rule is "one of the most important weapons in the Commission's arse-
nal to protect investors." Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th
Cir. 1961); In re Hinkle Northwest Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-15338 (Nov. 16,
1978).
The SEC's net capital requirement stems back to the 1920's, when the New York
Stock Exchange began to examine its member firms to assure that their capital was
adequate to sustain their businesses. These examinations sharply reduced the
number of member firm failures, as did the adoption of a rule that established a
maximum permissible ratio between a member firm's net capital and customer debit
balances. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 96, at 8 & n.41.
The efforts of the New York Stock Exchange prevented large scale failures by its
members during the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Congress, nevertheless, deter-
mined to impose capital requirements as a part of the regulatory structure established
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That act authorized the SEC to establish
permissible ratios of the "aggregate indebtedness" of broker-dealers to their "net capi-
tal (exclusive of fixed assets and value of exchange membership) employed in the
business, but not exceeding in any case 2,000 per centum ... " 15 U.S.C. 78h(b)
(1934).
The SEC's net capital rule received little attention until an SEC study of the
securities markets in 1963. The study found that a disproportionate number of viola-
tions of SEC rules occurred among broker-dealers with limited capital and that firms
with minimal net capital had a significantly higher chance of falling into financial
difficulties. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85, 92 (1963).
The brokerage industry's paperwork crisis in the late 1960's resulted in further net
capital concerns. As noted by the Supreme Court:
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960's, the securities
industry experienced a business contraction that led to the failure or
instability of a significant number of brokerage firms. Customers of
failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated
or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disas-
trous effects on customer assets and investor confidence, this situation
also threatened a 'domino effect' involving otherwise solvent brokers
that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975). An investi-
gation of the paperwork crisis by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce subsequently found that many of the broker dealers
experiencing financial difficulties were relatively new firms with small initial capitali-
zation. This tended "to produce a rapid and relatively serious deterioration in finan-
cial stability during the period of market decline in 1969 and 1970." Nicholas
Wolfson & Egon Guttman, The Net Capital Rules for Brokers and Dealers, 24 STAN. L. REv.
603, 609 (1972) (footnote omitted).
The SEC, thereafter, established an "early warning" mechanism that required
broker-dealers to notify it when their net capital ratio declined below a specified ratio.
Exchange Act Release No. 34-9268 (July 30, 1971). See generally SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND
DEALERs, H.R. Doc. No. 231, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1971).
The 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act also required the SEC to
"establish minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and dealers."
15 U.S.C. 78o(c) (3) The amendment was in response to perceived self-regulatory
failures: "This amendment... was largely the result of the failure of [the New York
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The SEC's net capital rule is not directly based on a risk assess-
ment of the positions held by a broker-dealer. Rather, it is a liquid-
ity test designed to assure that 'broker-dealers can meet their
obligations to customers in a timely manner. 2° The SEC, however,
has taken recognition of the particular risks posed by derivative in-
struments. For example, following the Stock Market Crash of 1987,
the SEC substantial raised the absolute minimum net capital re-
quirement for broker-dealers.20 The SEC noted that its net capital
levels had not increased for some fourteen years and that the com-
plexity of markets and the various activities of broker-dealers had
changed dramatically. Specifically, it noted that broker-dealers
were engaging in complex products such as interest rate swaps, for-
eign currency, mortgage backed securities, options, and futures.2
This was not the SEC's first encounter with derivative instru-
ments. Many of the broker-dealers it regulated were also partici-
pants in the futures markets and large scale defaults in those
markets had shown to the SEC that its capital requirements should
include provisions for those instruments. 210 Further, the SEC had
Stock Exchange] to enforce its own net capital rule, rule 325, against certain of its
members during the 'Paperwork Crisis' of 1967-1970." Molinari & Kibler, supra note
96, at 15 n.94 (citation omitted). See also Joel Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street
457-60 (1982). The SEC, thereafter adopted a "uniform" net capital rule for all bro-
kers and dealers.
The new rule continued the "basic" net capital concept in effect but also intro-
duced an "alternative" means for measuring the capital adequacy of broker-dealers.
The "basic" method for computing net capital limited the permissible amount of "ag-
gregate indebtedness" of a broker dealer to fifteen hundred percent of the broker-
dealer's "net capital." 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (1993). Broker-dealers using the "alterna-
tive" method were required to maintain net capital in an amount equal to the greater
of one hundred thousand dollars or a four percent of "aggregate debit items," but the
required four percent level was reduced in 1982 to two percent of aggregate debit
items. Michael P.Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 44 Bus. LAW. 863, 866 (1992). In 1992,
the minimum amount of net capital for broker-dealers engaging in a general securi-
ties business was increased to $250,000. Securities Exchange Release No. 34-31511
(Nov. 24, 1992).
207 Id.
208 Exchange Act Release No. 34-31511 (Nov. 24, 1992). For example, broker-deal-
ers that hold customers funds or securities were required to have a minimum net
capital of two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Id.
209 Exchange Act Release No. 34-27249 (Sept. 15, 1989).
210 For example, the SEC took action to guard broker-dealers from the effects of
commodity futures transactions after the Great Salad Oil Swindle in the early 1960s
that caused the suspension of two broker-dealers, Ira Haupt & Co., and J.R. Williston
& Bean. Exchange Act Release No. 9891 (Dec. 25, 1972). Those provisions are con-
tained in a separate appendix to the net capital rule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lb (1993).
Appendix B to the SEC's net capital rule requires certain adjustments to be made to
net worth and aggregate indebtedness for specified commodities transactions. Id.
For background on the Salad Oil swindle, see NoRMAN C. MILLER, THE GREAT SALAD
OIL SWINDLE (1965).
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acquired regulatory jurisdiction over exchange traded equity op-
tions that made their appearance on the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc. in 1973. Transactions in such options quickly grew
in volume to the point that they constituted a major marketplace in
and of themselves. 21 1 The highly leveraged nature of those options
An equally serious net capital concern arose in 1980 as a result of futures trading
during the Hunt "Silver Crisis," which threatened the capital of some large brokerage
firms. Staff of the SEC, Report on the Silver Crisis of 1980 (Oct. 1982). The SEC
changed its net capital rule to compensate for the dangers presented to broker-deal-
ers by the futures trading of the Hunts and others. Exchange Act Release No. 17927
(July 9, 1981); Exchange Act Release No. 34-17564 (Feb. 20, 1981).
The CFTC also imposes net capital requirements on futures commission
merchants, i.e., futures brokers. The statutory authority to impose minimum financial
responsibility requirements on firms engaged in the futures business was not enacted,
however, until 1968, and it did not prove effective. Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26
(1968). Soon after its creation in 1975, the CFTC began examining methods to
strengthen financial responsibility requirements in the commodity futures industry.
Among other things, the CFTC strengthened regulatory requirements by requiring
audited financial statements and increased reporting concerning the financial condi-
tion of futures commission merchants. In so doing, the Commission sought to make
its net capital requirements uniform throughout the futures industry, except that
firm's meeting approved minimum financial requirements of contract markets would
still not be subject to those requirements. Proposed Financial Reporting Require-
ments for Futures Commission Merchants [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,220 (Oct. 15, 1976). Later, the CFTC stated that increased net
capital and reporting requirements were needed to reflect changes in the industry.
Futures Commission Merchants; Minimum Financial Requirements; Proposed
Rulemaking [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,423
(C.F.T.C. May 26, 1977).
The CFTC subsequently adopted a rule to require all contract markets to adopt
minimum financial requirements for their members. The rule, however, allowed the
exchanges to delegate the monitoring of a member's financial responsibility to a sin-
gle contract market in instances where a futures commission merchant was a member
of more than one exchange. CFTC Final Rules Governing Futures and Options
Transactions, 19 Sec. Reg & L. Rep. 1152, 1155 (BNA) (July 31, 1987). The CFTC
also acted to increase uniformity of net capital requirements between the commodity
futures industry and the securities industry. Proposed Adoption and Monitoring of
Minimum Financial Requirements by Self-Regulatory Organizations [1977-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,456 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 1, 1977).
Today, CFTC Regulation 1.17 specifies the minimum financial requirements for
futures commission merchants whose customers are dealing in commodity instru-
ments regulated by the CFTC and who are not members of a self-regulatory organiza-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1) & (2) (1993). CFTC regulations require futures
commission merchants to maintain adjusted net capital in the greater of fifty thou-
sand dollars or four percent of customer funds required to be segregated pursuant to
the Commodity Exchange Act, less the market value of commodity options purchased
by options customers on a contract market. Broker-dealers dually registered with the
SEC can fulfill CFTC requirements by meeting the amount of net capital required by
the SEC's net capital rule. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a) (1)(i) (C) (1993).
211 See generally HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1979).
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transactions required special net capital treatment. Accordingly,
an appendix was added to the net capital rule for options transac-
tions. 2  Further improvements were made as the result of con-
cerns on the options markets during the Stock Market Crash of
1987.213
In May of 1993, as the result of growing concerns with the de-
rivatives market, the SEC issued a "concepts" release seeking com-
ments on the need for additional net capital requirements for
those broker-dealers engaging in transactions in the derivative
products markets. The SEC was concerned that the risks inherent
in these transactions, which would include such things as options,
futures contracts, forward contracts, and swaps, presented dangers
to broker-dealers that were not being reflected in the current net
capital rule. The SEC release reviewed various proposals by the
Securities Industry Association and others for risk models that
could be used for net capital requirements for derivatives.2 14
212 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-la (1993). The SEC has adopted a system for "haircuts"
(i.e., reductions in value for net worth deductions to reflect lack of liquidity) for listed
options held by broker-dealers that establishes differing standards for firms carrying
accounts of options specialists and those held by other broker-dealers. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (x) (1993). The latter are governed by Appendix A of the Rule. 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-la (1993). Appendix A presents a peculiarly difficult method for
computing net capital with regard to options positions. It essentially requires a de-
duction for most uncovered option positions. While this concept may be simple, the
method for deriving the appropriate amount is not. The complex formula is
designed to take into account the value of the underlying securities as well as the
value of the option. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-la(b)(1) (1993). The SEC's net capital rule
for options thus:
provides for two different capital treatments for standardized options
positions held by broker-dealers. The first approach assumes that op-
tions will be exercised or held to expiration. Therefore, capital charges
are based on the market value of the underlying security. The second
approach assumes that options will be traded and, therefore, capital
charges are based on the market value of the option rather than the
underlying security. Both approaches generally assess minimum charges
for uncovered option positions or recognized option strategies.
LEACH REPORT (PART 2), supra note 3, at 177.
213 The SEC staff concluded from its study of the 1987 Crash that net capital re-
quirements for short options positions were inadequate to insure against the risk of
major market movements. 1987 CRASH REPORT, supra note 204, at 5-46. The SEC staff
also questioned whether increased net capital requirements should be imposed for
futures positions because the staff believed that exchange-set margin levels were
sometimes inadequate, and because margin changes in a volatile market required
rapid net capital adjustments that might be difficult without adequate capitalization.
Id. at 5-16.
214 Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256 (May 4, 1993). See also Sandra Block, SEC
Will Hold Forum on Rules For Derivatives, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1993, at A6.
The [SEC] Concept Release proposes adopting a theoretical pricing
model system developed by the Options Clearing Corporation to deter-
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The SEC's proposal was a significant departure from the li-
quidity standard of its traditional net capital requirement. The
SEC was aware that its traditional net capital requirements were
penalizing derivative instrument dealers because unrealized profits
associated with an over-the-counter derivative are treated as an un-
secured receivable that is subject to one hundred percent capital
charge. This had resulted in brokers and dealers forming subsidi-
aries to avoid this problem. 215
The SEC sought to deal with criticism of the application of its
net capital requirements to derivatives by proposing a special rule
for such transactions that is based on a risk assessment of deriva-
tives.216 For exchange traded options, the SEC would allow the use
of the Cox-Ross-Rubenstein binomial model that would use the op-
tions theoretical gains and losses in relation to assumed value fluc-
tuations. 2 1 The SEC is allowing firms to experiment with this risk
capital approach while it is reviewing comments. 218 This, hope-
mine haircuts for broker-dealers' standardized options positions under
the net capital rule. The proposal under consideration would require
broker-dealers to take a capital charge on a portfolio of options on a
given underlying instrument equal to the difference between the clos-
ing market prices and the options' theoretical prices after applying as-
sumed market movements of the underlying instrument and after
netting theoretical profits and losses on those positions.
The Concept Release stated that because the market risk of a deriv-
ative product is related to the market risk of the underlying asset, the
underlying asset may be used to offset the market risk of the derivative.
Participants in the derivative markets argue that the appropriate ap-
proach to measuring market risk is not to measure the price sensitivity
of the individual contract, but of the portfolio of contracts and related
assets and liabilities that a particular dealer holds.
LEACH REPORT (PART 2), supra note 3, at 177.
215 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
216 For example, with respect to interest rate swaps:
The Concept Release presented two alternative approaches. The
first approach would calculate exposure from a large interest rate swap
book into a portfolio of specified debt securities that are equivalent, in
terms of interest rate sensitivity, to the swap payment flows. These de-
rived securities would then be treated under the net capital rule in the
same way as actual bond positions with the same characteristics. The
value of the derived securities would be calculated in terms of the zero
coupon bond equivalent. The second approach is to assign the notional
amount of the swaps to the maturity bonds currently in use for govern-
ment securities, and apply a capital charge, ranging from 0-6%, depend-
ing on maturity. The capital charges of long and short positions in
swaps could be offset depending on the relative maturities of two swaps,
or could be hedged with other debt instruments.
LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
217 Exchange Release No. 34-33761 (Mar. 15, 1994).
218 Id.
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fully, will provide some meaningful data on the efficacy of such an
approach.219
219 The SEC has been less helpful in cooperative efforts to establish uniform capital
standards on an international basis. The International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO") has spent several years in an effort to create a common in-
ternational standard for net capital requirements for securities firms. An IOSCO pro-
posal sought to create the equivalent of the Basle Accord that established an
international capital standard for banks as a cushion against loan defaults. See Securi-
ties Regulation: Capital Spat, THE ECONOMIST, October 31, 1992, at 76; Tracy Corrigan
& Robert Peston, IOSCO Setback Over Common Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1992, International Capital Markets at 33. See generally Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Cap-
ital Adequacy Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 133 (1992).
In 1992, IOSCO participants proposed a net capital standard of four percent of
gross holdings, plus eight percent of net holdings (after netting of long and short
positions). Securities Regulation: Capital Spat, THE ECONOMIST, October 31, 1992, at 76;
New Rules for Banks, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1993, at 20. The SEC Chairman, how-
ever, objected to the IOSCO proposal. Instead, he advocated a net capital standard
equal to a minimum of fifteen percent of gross holdings. The SEC Chairman be-
lieved that the IOSCO proposal was dangerous because the netting of positions would
mean that many securities firms would have a capital standing of only four percent of
their unhedged positions, which might be "dangerously low." He was also concerned
that hedged positions might not always operate as an effective hedge. The SEC Chair-
man stated that, if the IOSCO proposal had been in effect during the Stock Market
Crash of 1987, several more firms would have failed. Securities Regulation: Capital Spat
THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 76, 82. The IOSCO panel considering the establish-
ment of global capital standards thereafter found themselves split beyond compro-
mise after the SEC Chairman's opposition to the panel's earlier proposals. The result
was to effectively stymie the development of an international net capital standard.
IOSCO Panel Drops Compromise Effort Regarding Global Capital Standards, 25 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. 216 (BNA) (Feb. 12, 1993).
On July 27, 1992, the Council of Ministers for the European Community adopted
a "common position" on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institu-
tions. Common Position Adopted by the Council on July 27, 1992 with a view to the
Adoption of a Council Directive on the Capital Adequacy Of Investment Firms and
Credit Institutions [hereinafter Common Position]. Among other things, the Coun-
cil's position imposed a net capital requirement of ECU 125,000 for firms acting
solely as brokers or managers of customer investments and which hold client's money
or securities. Common Position at Article 3. Other investment firms are required to
have initial capital of ECU 730,000. Id.
The Council's common position also established various risk- weighted formula
for determining the capital adequacy of securities firms engaging in proprietary trad-
ing or other risk related activities. The common position, for example, required se-
curity firms to maintain capital equal to two percent of their gross positions in highly
liquid equity securities and eight percent of their net positions. Tracy Corrigan and
Robert Peston, IOSCO Setback Over Common Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1992; Securities Regulation: Capital Spa4 THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 76. In calcu-
lating their risk exposure on equity positions, firms are required to net their long and
short positions in the same investments. The remaining long and short positions are
then added together to determine the firm's overall gross position. The difference
between the long and short position constitutes the firm's overall net position. Com-
mon Position, Annex I, 1 1 & 31. The Council's common position additionally es-
tablishes capital requirements for debt, foreign exchange and other instruments
traded by securities firms. Common Position, Annexes I-IV.
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Bank regulators have taken a somewhat different approach to
capital requirements for the institutions they regulate. Capital re-
quirements for banks engaging in derivative activities are based on
the Basle Accords of 1988, an agreement among international
banking authorities on the appropriate methodology for regulat-
ing bank capital.22 ° This standard is based on the credit risks asso-
ciated with an institution's balance sheet activities, and banks are
required to hold capital against the credit equivalent amount of
off-balance sheet risks.221
Bank regulators are now considering additional capital re-
quirements to reflect the dangers posed by derivative instruments
and related risks from interest rate exposures.22 Comment has
been sought on a proposal to establish procedures measuring bank
interest rate risk exposures based on one of two methods. One
220 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision was established by the Central
Bank of Governors of the Group of Ten Countries in 1975.' LEACH REPORT, supra note
3, at 94. Its most important achievement was the establishment of minimum capital
standards for credit risks of banks. For a detailed discussion of the capital require-
ments for banks and their derivative instruments, see id. at 6869.
221 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
In 1988, the Basle Committee on Banks and Regulations of Supervisory
Practices of the Banks and International Settlements ("BIS") adopted
international guidelines for Bank Standards that include all types of bal-
ance sheet instruments. The guidelines require banks to maintain capi-
tal equal to eight percent of their risk-weighted assets. The BIS
provided explicit procedures for determining the risk-weight of interest
rates and currency swaps.
Id. This requirement is based on the present credit risk exposure plus the potential
for future credit risk exposure. Present risk is marked-to-market and represents the
replacement costs of the derivative. The potential future credit exposure is the no-
tional amount of the derivative multiplied by a risk factor of five percent or more,
depending on the type of contract. The credit equivalent amount is multiplied by the
proper risk-weight of fifty percent based on the identity of the counterpartyor the
nature of the collateral. LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26. The risk exposure is
supposed to be calculated by an original exposure method in which credit risk is
assumed to be a percentage of the risk of a notional principal or current disclosure
method based on current replacement costs of the contract. CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. More recently, the Comptroller of Cur-
rency proposed capital requirements that would lower the risk weight from twenty to
zero percent for particular transactions that are collateralized by cash or government
securities. LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
In addition, United States regulators have imposed a leverage capital standard on
banks and thrift associations. The highest rated banks are required to maintain a
leverage capital ratio of at least three percent. LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.
222 Keith Bradsher, U.S. to Order Higher Bank Reserves, NY. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at
CL Section 305 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of
1991 also requires banks to revise their risk based capital guide lines to account for
interest rate risks and non-traditional activities such as derivatives. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §305, 105 Stat.
2236 (1991).
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method is the Minimum Capital Standard which would impose a
minimum capital charge based on the amount of risk exposure
above a threshold level. Another method, the Risk Assessment
Method, would base capital requirements on a case by case basis.22 3
The Basle Committee proposals of April 1993 would also
change capital requirements to recognize market risk as well to im-
pose a measurement of interest rate risks. 224 Although this propo-
sal is more of a measurement system than one to establish a new
capital requirements, 225 it would impose additional capital require-
ments for open positions that involve market risks.226
The regulatory struggles with an appropriate capital standard
for derivatives all turn on the difficulty of risk identification and
the proper methodology for measuring that risk. This is exempli-
fied by recent statements by the Comptroller of the Currency con-
cerning capital adequacy of national banks dealing in derivatives.
He stated that capital adequacy would include factors such as "the
quality of the bank's risk management systems, exposure to credit
concentrations, as well as liquidity, interest rate, market, legal, and
operational risks." 227 Banks deficient in those factors would be ex-
pected to hold capital above minimum requirements. 228 Such stan-
223 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.
224 The Bank for International Settlements has opposed more direct regulation of
derivative instruments. Philip Coggan, BIS Wary of Direct Curbs on Derivatives, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 6.
225 LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
226 Id. at 28. See also Derivatives, The Beauty in the Beast, THE ECONOMIST, May 14,
1994, at 21, 24; Norma Cohen, Bank Rules to Reflect New Derivatives Risks, FIN. TIMES,
July 15, 1994, at 15 (describing rules proposed by the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision to require banks to hold more capital against complex derivative instru-
ments). The Basle Committee proposals issued for public comment in April of 1993
would recognize reduction of.credit risk from netting arrangements for derivatives
contracts. The proposal also recognized market risk from derivative instruments.
Criticism, however, has been directed at the market risk proposal because of the rules
used for measuring risk. Susan M. Phillips, Member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Derivatives and Risk Management: Challenges and Opportunities,
Remarks at the Conference on Financial Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 8
(Feb. 25, 1994).
Other commentators have suggested an alternative that essentially would allow
banks to use their own internal models to determine capital requirements for market
risk. For example, regulators could specify that banks would have to set aside suffi-
cient capital to cover 95 percent to 99 percent of potential losses over a two week
period from the positions held by the bank. This potential loss would be based on the
historical movement over the last five years. Susan M. Phillips, Member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Derivatives and Risk Management: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, Remarks at the Conference on Financial Markets, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta 9 (Feb. 25, 1994).
227 Kenneth H. Bacon, Derivatives Rule, supra note 155, at A2.
228 Id.
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dards sound responsible and prudent, but they are simply words
without meaning and contribute little towards the creation of a
quantifiable net capital standard.
The risks from derivative instruments may not always be easily
computed, even with sophisticated risk models.22 9 Further, deriva-
tive instruments in the over-the-counter market are almost by defi-
nition unique in their terms. Therefore, each will have a different
risk assessment profile. Moreover, new instruments with wide vari-
ations are being created constantly.230
Even assuming the development of appropriate risk models,
difficult issues still remain. For example, what level of capital
should be required? Firms with a determined percent of exposure
should be required to have a specified amount of capital to sup-
port those risks. But, how is that amount to be determined? Fur-
ther, consideration must be given to counterparty risks,
229 The Group of Thirty addressed the "value at risk and its measurement for deriv-
atives transactions:"
Value at risk is the expected loss from an adverse market movement
with a specified probability over a period of time. For example, partici-
pants can determine with 97.5% probability (corresponding to calcula-
tions using about two standard deviations) that any adverse change in
portfolio value over one day will not exceed a calculated amount. Con-
versely, the probability of an adverse change in excess of the calculated
amount is 2.5%. Value at risk should encompass changes in all major
market risk components and be calculated to a common confidence
interval and time horizon.
GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT (Appendix I), supra note 2, at 8. The report noted, how-
ever, that "[m]aking assumptions as to likely rate moves and therefore risk scenarios is
a somewhat arbitrary process, but consistency across activities is important." Id. at 9.
Firms at this point are still struggling with how to account for and value derivative
positions. Upgrades in technology will be needed in order to assure integration of
computer systems in a firm's dealings with swaps on any wide-scale basis. Patrick
Harverson, Technology, Integration Top of the Agenda, FIN. TIMES (Survey), October 20,
1993, at VII. Bankers Trust, however, now offers processing for third parties of deriva-
tive instruments. Its system "tracks exposures, makes margin calls, and handles the
pricing and custody of the assets pledged as collateral." Laurie Morse, Clearing Swaps
Trade Dodges Issue, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at VI.
The derivatives futures industry is also spending considerable sums on efforts to
apply complicated computer programs to measuring risk in handling derivatives
transactions. BarnabyJ. Feder, Sophisticated Software Set For Exotic Financial Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at Cl. Funds utilizing derivative instruments are seeking the
help of outside experts in order to assess the risk of those transactions. Steven Lipin,
Firms Seek Quick Derivative Education, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at C1.
230 Bankers Trust has established a method for "allocating capital based on an anal-
ysis of both credit and market risk through a unified model. Known as 'raroc' for
('risk-adjusted return on capital'), this risk capital allocation model was adjusted a
year ago to take more account of the liquidity risk implicit in different types of assets,
* ' * (the lower the liquidity, the higher the capital charge applied internally)." Rich-
ard Waters, New Box of Risk-Management Tricks, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at II.
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concentrated positions and related concerns. s1
231 An additional deduction is required under the SEC's net capital rule for any
"undue concentration" held by the broker-dealer in the securities of a single class or
series of an issuer, including any options to sell the securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
1 (c) (2) (vi) (M) (1993). This deduction does not apply to exempted securities and
redeemable securities of a registered investment company. Id. See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 11969 (Jan. 2, 1976); see also Wellington Management Company, 1976 SEC
No-Act LEXIS 411 (Jan. 19, 1976). For a discussion of haircuts on concentrated posi-
tions, see Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 Bus. Law. 863, 871 (1992).
Amendments to the net capital rule that were adopted in 1992 apply concentration
charges to money market instruments, securities of a single class of an issuer, and
options written or endorsed on equity securities (other than exempted securities and
redeemable securities of a registered investment company). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
I (c) (2) (vi) (M) (1993). The concentration charge is fifty percent of the haircut
otherwise required for such securities under the net capital rule or under Appendix A
in the case of options. Id. The SEC's concentration charge is in addition to the nor-
mal haircut for the securities in the concentrated position, but it applies only to those
positions in excess of ten percent of the net capital of the broker-dealer before the
application of haircuts. Id. For other securities, the additional deduction required
for concentrated positions is fifteen percent. The undue concentration charge in the
case of equity securities applies only to the market value in excess of ten thousand
dollars or the market value of five hundred shares, whichever is greater, or twenty-five
thousand dollars in the case of a debt security. Id. This concentration charge does
not apply to hedged positions that may be exchanged for the offsetting obligation.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE INTERPRETATION HANDBOOK 223-25, 282 (1979).
The SEC net capital rule also applies quite severe haircuts on securities positions
in which there is no ready market. Exchange Act Release No. 34-32,784 (Aug. 16,
1993). These positions are subject to a reduction of one hundred percent of their
value. This includes securities in a proprietary account of the broker-dealer which
cannot be publicly offered or sold because of statutory, regulatory, or contractual
arrangements or other restrictions, as well as the simple lack of a market. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (vii) (1993). See generally In re Guy. D. Marianette, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-3281, 11 S.E.C. 967, 970 (Aug. 3, 1942). A "ready market" is defined to
include a recognized established securities market with competitive pricing almost
instantaneously and where settlement will occur within a short period of time. Rule
15c3-1 (c)(11) (1993). A ready market may be deemed to exist where securities have
been accepted as collateral for a loan by a bank and the securities adequately secure
the loan. J. Alexander Securities, Inc., 1980 SEC No-Act LEXIS 3135 (Mar. 26, 1980).
The CFTC has also encountered problems with concentrated positions. A bro-
kerage firm trading commodity options (Volume Investors Inc.) failed because of a
heavily concentrated position in a single commodity (gold options) that it was carry-
ing on behalf of certain customers. The firm's financial condition was not sufficient
to withstand losses caused by the failure of those customers to meet multi-millon dol-
lar margin calls following a sharp market movement. In re Volume Investors Corp.,
[1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 125,234 (C.F.T.C. 1992).
The CFTC later noted that a futures commission merchant was subject to substantial
risk when it carried a large customer position on one side of the market. The futures
commission merchant would be vulnerable in such a case to a sudden sharp price
movement that erodes the equity in accounts carried by it. This danger is heightened
where those positions are held by only a few traders who may not be able to meet
their margin calls. CFTC Proposed Amendments to Minimum Financial Require-
ments, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1425 (BNA) (August 2, 1985). As a result of this failure,
the CFTC proposed concentration charges that would require deductions from net
capital for heavily concentrated customer positions. Id. The CFTC, however, encoun-
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Hopefully, past experience and new computer models will
provide some guidance on these issues. Even so, derivative dealers
and their regulators will be dependent for financial stability on
rather arcane and extremely complicated concepts. It is doubtful
that many managers will understand such a complicated net capital
formula, and even fewer will be able to asses whether it is sufficient
to protect their firm. Unfortunately, this uncertainty will also push
regulators towards unnecessarily strict capital standards. As loss ex-
perience grows, however, overly strict standards can be loosened.
One mechanism that could be used to reduce capital charges
is the creation of clearinghouses for over-the-counter derivatives.
Clearinghouses would also substantially reduce counterparty risks
for dealers and end users as well. Like everything about deriva-
tives, however, that concept has also raised a considerable amount
of controversy.
A. Clearinghouse Proposals
Although net capital requirements provide some measure of
protection from failures caused by counterparty defaults, they are
intended principally to guard against losses caused by product
risks. Traditionally, counterpartyrisks have been treated as a credit
function that is guarded against by collateral requirements and as-
sessment of the credit worthiness of the borrower. In the futures
industry, however, exchange traded futures and options have ad-
dressed the counterparty risk by the use of clearinghouses that act
as guarantors of performance.2 32
tered heavy industry criticism as a result of its concentration charge proposals. The
industry requested that the CFTC allow industry representatives to explore an alterna-
tive that would contain a risk-based minimum capital requirement. The CFTC, there-
after, reproposed its concentration charges, having backed off considerably from its
earlier proposals. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,498 (Dec. 1, 1980).
232 The clearinghouse acts as the buyer and seller to every contract that is entered
into on the exchange. The clearinghouse is interceded between the actual purchaser
and seller of the futures or options contract. The clearinghouse thereupon becomes
guarantor to the parties. If one party to the contract defaults, the clearinghouse will
be responsible to the other party because of its intercession. See CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 27-31 (1982) (description of clearing systems).
The first clearinghouses appear to have been the ancient temples of Mesopota-
mia. SwAN, supra note 1, at 11-13. Clearing systems were also used in the fairs held
during the Middle Ages, including a particularly effective settlement system at the
fairs of Lyons. Clearinghouses for bank debits and credits are also of long standing.
BAER & WOODRUFF, supra note 47, at 46. Modern clearinghouses on the futures ex-
changes trace their development from the evolution of direct settlements and "ring"
settlements that were in use by the 1870s in the grain markets. Direct settlements
involved two brokers simply offsetting or netting their buy and sell transactions with
each other. Ring settlements involved the equivalent of multilateral netting agree-
1994]
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
There have been very few instances of clearinghouse failures
or defaults on futures contracts.3 3 This is because the clearing-
houses are backed up with several defensive mechanisms. First,
they impose margin requirements on their clearing firms.23 4 This
assures, to some extent, that a party engaging in a derivative con-
tract, even one as volatile as a futures contract, will have sufficient
funds on deposit at the clearinghouse to assure performance. The
contracts are marked-to-market each day as a further assurance of
performance. That computation will result in a demand for more
margin if the market has moved adversely to the party's position.
This "variation" margin requirement forces a daily recognition of
losses in cash and prevents a firm from delaying recognition of the
loss in hopes that the market will improve.3 5
In the event that margin funds are not sufficient to cover a
loss, the customer will still be liable. The customer's firm or bro-
ments. Several parties offset their buy and sell transactions among themselves. Id. at
47-51; G. WRIGHT HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 189-91 (1932). In 1884, the Chicago Board of Trade organized a
clearing association for handling money balances arising from settlements among
members, and that process spread to the New York Cotton Exchange in 1896. Id. at
195-96. The commodities exchanges established modem clearing systems that al-
lowed them to have greater control and surveillance over trading were after concerns
arose with price fluctuations after World War I. FLUCTUATIONS IN WHEAT FUTURES, S.
Doc. No. 135, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1926).
Clearinghouses have proved helpful outside the futures industry. One author
asserts that experiences in the Panic of 1907justify the use of clearinghouses for deriv-
atives. He points out that panic was touched off by the failure of the Knickerbocker
Trust Company in New York. Other failures followed, but those failures were concen-
trated in firms that were not using clearinghouse facilities that were available to regu-
lated banks and to trust companies in Chicago. Dennis M. Earle, Controlling Risk and
Regulatory Reform, Futures Industry Law & Compliance Division Conference Paper,
Baltimore, Md. (May 12-13, 1994).
Automated check clearing operations are now widely used in the banking indus-
try. WILLIAM D. HAwKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 4-101:19
(1992). The government Securities Clearing Corporation is also used in the securities
industry to guard against counterparty risk in government securities transactions. Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-33237 (Nov. 22, 1993). The Options Clearing Corporation
serves this function for exchange traded securities options. See generally Exchange Act
Release No. 34-33873 (Apr. 7, 1994).
233 The Stock Market Crash of 1987 posed perhaps the greatest test to the clearing-
house system. During that short period of market stress, billions of dollars were trans-
ferred between buyers and sellers of the futures contracts through the clearinghouses.
Although there was a liquidity crisis because of the large demands for cash, the clear-
inghouses fulfilled all of their obligations. Nevertheless, a Presidential Commission
recommended a unified clearing system to clarify credit risks from exchange traded
financial derivatives. Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms
51-53, 64 (Jan. 8, 1988).
234 The clearing firms in turn impose margin requirements on their customers.
Markham, supra note 49, at 63-64.
235 Id.
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kerage firm (a futures commission merchant) is also responsible to
the clearinghouse for any deficit. Since the clearinghouse is, in the
last measure, responsible for a default, it will make sure that clear-
ing members have large amounts of capital that can be called upon
to cover deficits in a customer account or in the proprietary ac-
counts of the clearing member. A third line of defense is found in
contingency funds established by the clearinghouses. Each con-
tract traded on the exchange is assessed with a fee that is put into a
fund to guard against defaults. In extremis, and after that contin-
gency fund is exhausted, the clearinghouse may make additional
monetary demands upon other members.2"6
The clearinghouse has proved to be a marvelous instrument in
developing derivative products because, at least to date, it has virtu-
ally eliminated the counterparty risk. The success of the equity op-
tions market in Chicago is also directly traceable to the Options
Clearing Corporation, which has proved to be both innovative and
careful in assuring that its members perform on their contracts.237
The success of the clearinghouse concept presents an obvious
model for guarding against counterparty risk in the over-the-
counter derivatives market.238 The margin concept that is inextri-
cably intertwined with the clearinghouse concept also has an allure
for regulators because it requires risk recognition and customer
protection from counterparty failures. 239 The problem is that it is
difficult to create a clearinghouse for over-the-counter derivatives.
A critical component of the clearinghouse concept is the fungibil-
ity of the exchange traded contracts. Fungibility allows the
clearinghouse to net out its risks from offsetting contracts. The
clearinghouse can then monitor margin requirements easily, and it
has complete control over the clearing of trades to assure liability
on all transactions.240
236 THOMAS A. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 43-45 (1977); CHI-
CAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 28-31 (1982).
237 The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. was created to apply commodity
trading principles to stock options trading. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137,
1140 n.2 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). The Options Clearing
Corporation has "virtually eliminated counterparty risk" in the trading of exchange
listed options. Exchange Act Release No. 34-33100 (Oct. 25, 1993).
238 The SEC believes that the creation of one or more clearinghouses specializing
in the processing of trades and swaps could improve this regulatory framework.
LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 19, 51.
239 About two-thirds of derivative dealers are already accepting cash or securities as
collateral as credit enhancement for counterparties. GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra
note 2, at 17.
240 One suggestion has been to limit the clearinghouse function to that of a third
party agent to collect collateral to secure over-the-counter derivative transactions.
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Over-the-counter derivatives are not fungible. The creation of
an over-the-counter derivatives clearinghouse, therefore, will not
be easy. The customized nature of over-the-counter derivatives has
made them popular with institutional customers. Their custom-
ized nature also provides a competitive edge for dealers in such
instruments that could be eliminated if they are standardized on
exchanges. 2 1  The market would simply become another ex-
change derivative that, to date, have gradually been losing the com-
petitive race with over-the-counter derivatives.242
This could substantially reduce counterpartyrisks, but there has been little interest to
date in such a proposal. LEACH REPORT (PART 2), supra note 3, at 121.
An example of the dangers that arise from the absence of a clearinghouse can be
found in the interbank currency market in the form of the "Hestatt risk." Named
after a bank failure, this risk occurs where settlement occurs in different time zones.
Payment may be made by one party, but payment by the counterparty is not made
until the next day because of time zone differences. If a failure occurs on the part of
the latter, the former is out its payment and may have only a claim in bankruptcy for
the failed payment from the bankrupt counterparty. Foreign Exchange Unsettling, THE
ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 88.
241 One Congressional Committee has identified the benefits and detriments of a
clearinghouse as follows:
a. Primary Benefits:
Reduction/elimination of counterpartycredit risk;
Daily position/contract valuation;
Calling, receiving and posting of collateral requirements;
Execution of technical and administrative considerations,
including data collection and trade matching;
Provision of liquidity to the corresponding market;
Allowance for increased competition in the market by providing op-
portunities for smaller firms; and
Provision for industry-wide trade confirmation policy.
b. Primary Drawbacks.
Loss of flexibility in designing derivative contracts;
Allowance for numerous entities to participate in the markets some
of which may not be suitably qualified; and
A clearinghouse arrangement could expose dealers to unquantified,
and potentially large, failure risk (all systemic risks, issues).
LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
242 In 1989, the CFTC stated that swaps would not be subject to its jurisdiction if
they were not supported by a clearinghouse. John Emert, Selected Issues Involving Net-
ting of Derivatives and Foreign Exchange Transactions, Futures Industry Association Law &
Compliance Division Workshop, 12 (May 26-29, 1993). This may have inhibited the
development of a swaps clearinghouse because of the concern that the creation of
such an entity would result in an exchange trading requirement under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act. The CFTC, however, has been showing flexibility on this point.
CFTC REPORT, supra note 118, at 136-38.
In the meantime, the futures exchanges are seeking to develop products that will
compete with the customized derivatives. CME Rolling Spot Rolled into Exempt Area,
FutruRss INDUsTRy, Nov/Dec 1993, at 15; Jeffrey Taylor, Chicago Merc Sets Interbank
Traders' Currency Contracts, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A6. The Federal Reserve
Board, however, has questioned whether bank subsidiaries could engage in such con-
DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
If over-the-counter derivative contracts are not standardized it
is difficult to envision how they will be traded through a clearing-
house. It will be difficult for a clearinghouse to make credit assess-
ments or impose margin requirements for the wide diversity of
over-the-counter instruments that are subject to widely varying ter-
mination dates and other diverse terms and conditions. Each in-
strument would have to be considered separately for margin
requirements. 24
3
Nevertheless, the use of the clearinghouse would greatly facili-
tate the development of risk assessment models that could be ap-
plied to many over-the-counter derivatives that have some
uniformity in terms, loss experience and modeling history. Swaps,
the largest segment of the over-the-counter derivatives market, now
operate principally off uniform forms and conditions.244 The mar-
gining of these instruments, however, would have to be adjusted
for maturity dates or other individualized nuances such as amount,
interest rate, currency, or other commodity that underlies the
swap. The workload for even these semi-standardized contracts
would be many times that required for a futures clearinghouse.
Nevertheless, risk models developed by a clearinghouse could elim-
inate a lot of duplicative efforts by separate over-the-counter deriva-
tives dealers.
The World Bank has all ready proposed a swaps clearing-
house,245 but its cost and complexity has precluded its develop-
ment to date.246 A joint venture has also been organized that
proposes to establish an over-the-counter derivatives clearing facil-
tracts. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 34-33732 (Mar. 8, 1994) (cash/spot
foreign currency option contracts traded on securities exchange); Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-32781 (Aug. 20, 1993) (flexible option contracts traded on securities
exchange); Exchange Act Release No. 34-33100 (Oct. 25, 1993) ("flex" option con-
tracts traded on securities exchange).
243 The derivatives trade is "highly customized." Morse, supra note 229, at VI.
244 Most swap dealers use standardized contracts in order to reduce credit risk. Lau-
rie Morse, Legal Issues, Quest for Definitive Answers, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at
IV.
245 Anne Schwimmer, World Bank Leads Effort for Swaps Clearinghous; Proposes Pilot
Program with Major Dealers, INvEsrMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, Dec. 20, 1993, at 5. The
World Bank wants a clearinghouse in order to allow greater access to developing
countries. Id.
246 Id. There is little support in the regulatory community, the dealer community
or the end-user community for a formalized clearinghouse although some "mild"
clearinghouse may be thought to be beneficial to it. LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at
21-22. Nevertheless, a proposal has been presented for the creation of a clearing-
house for swaps. The first phase of this project would be to create a prototype screen-
ing system that will allow third-party administration of over-the-counter swaps. In the
second stage, swap contracts would be standardized and backed with a clearinghouse
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ity sometime this year.24 7 In Europe, the Exchange Clearing House
organization plans to clear foreign currency contracts in the near
future.248 The effectiveness of these efforts will be uncertain for
some time.249 In the meantime, a concept that is receiving the
most attention is "netting."
B. "Netting"
Netting simply involves the offsetting of similar contracts with
a counterparty. For example, the exposure of a firm having long
and short contracts in the same currency with the same customer is
reduced to the extent the risks in the opposing contracts offset
each other. The offset may not, however, be complete. For exam-
ple, maturity dates or terms may vary. There may be a legal risk
that the netting of the contracts may not be recognized in bank-
ruptcy, leaving the firm doubly exposed.25" Nevertheless, there is
some economic reduction of risk in netting that should be
recognized. 251
guarantee. CBOT will Launch Stage One of Swaps Clearinghouse Soon, INVESTMENT
DEALER'S DIGEST, Mar. 14, 1994, at 7.
247 This joint venture is named Multi-net, and is it is being developed by Interna-
tional Clearing Systems Inc., a subsidiary of the Options Clearing Corporation
("OCC"), and the North American Clearing House. Laurie Morse, Group Plans Clear-
ing House for Forex Trades, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1994, at 26. The OCC clears all ex-
change traded equity options in the United States.
248 Id.; see also Morse, -supra note 229, at VI.
249 One industry critic has asserted that clearinghouses could not be established in
the over-the-counter derivatives market because these contracts are priced in different
ways by different participants and are tailor made so that margins would be impossible
to calculate for such a transaction. Mayer, supra note 119, at A18.
Another obstacle to the development of a clearinghouse has been the self-inter-
est of the banks and dealers who conduct most of the world swap trade. "They value
the competitive edge their credit ratings deliver, and are satisfied with their own
credit controls." Without their participation, a swaps clearinghouse cannot be ar-
ranged. Morse, supra note 229, at VI.
As an alternative to a clearinghouse, swaps dealers have been imposing strict
credit standards and controls and limits on counterparties. In addition, collateral
(equivalent to margins) is being required in most transactions, and positions are
marked to market to assess risk. These are all clearinghouse functions. Id.
250 "If the contract is terminated early, because of bankruptcy or liquidation, the
netting agreements allow payables and receivables to cancel each other out, limiting
the credit risk of the solvent counter parties to net exposure." Laurie Morse, Legal
Issues Quest For Definitive Answer, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at IV. Netting
agreements, however, have only recently been recognized in bankruptcy proceedings
and there have been difficulties in their enforcement in France. Id. A 1989 ruling in
the United States allowed netting between United States counterparties and the prac-
tice is recognized in the United Kingdom. Id.
251 One critic, however, has stated that netting will conceal the risk of derivative
instruments. Mayer, supra note 119, at A18.
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Netting may be bilateral (as is the case for many over-the-
counter derivatives) 252 or multilateral (as is the case for the clear-
inghouses) .253 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of
the Bank for International Settlements has proposed a program to
recognize bilateral closeout netting agreements in determining
bank capital adequacy. 2 4 An issue here, however, is multi-branch
netting i.e., there is concern that if a bank collapses regulators in
various countries may not recognize a netting agreement.255 More-
over, while a multi-lateral netting system would help reduce credit
risk, such a system would be hard to distinguish from a clearing-
house on the futures exchanges. 256 This would raise the specter of
CFTC regulation and exchange trading requirement that the in-
dustry has long sought to avoid.257
Some certainty may be added to this area by recent legislation.
For example, the Financial Market Protection Act of 1992 would
give Congressional recognition to netting arrangements. 258 Fed-
eral Reserve Board proposals would also allow reduction of expo-
sure for restrictions on exposure limits from derivatives and
currency transactions. 259 The CFTC also allows, under the Futures
Trading Act of 1992 exemption, bilateral netting agreements or
252 Swap dealers often use bilateral netting agreements. Legal Issues Quest for Defini-
tive Answers, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct. 20, 1993, at IV.
253 Emert, supra note 242, at 3. Netting agreements may be under a master-netting
agreement or a multi-product master netting agreement which allow netting of trans-
actions of several products among counterparties in the event of default or other
"meltdown" situations. Id. at 5.
254 The Basle Committee has published a netting paper describing circumstances
under which netting arrangements would be recognized for capital purposes. Emert,
supra note 242, at 7.
The Basle committee's guidelines do not now recognize netting of swaps, which
requires banks to satisfy capital on all swaps, whether off-set or not. This has been
criticized as being excessive. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 19. The Basle Committee's proposal, however, would cut capital reserve require-
ments for banks by more than half because of netting agreements. Morse, supra note
229, at VI. The Basle committee's netting proposal would expand the terms of the
1988 Basle Capital Accord by allowing the use of bi-lateral netting in the determina-
tion of the capital requirements for foreign exchange and interest rate contracts. If
adopted in the United States, the proposal would allow domestic banking institutions
to benefit from United States law, which appears to provide sufficient certainty re-
garding the enforceability of netting arrangements. This would allow reduced capital
requirements. LEACH REPORT, supra note 3, at 63.
255 Laurie Morse, Legal Issues, Quest for Definitive Answers, FIN. TIMES (Survey), Oct.
20, 1993, at IV; Emert, supra note 242, at 10.
256 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20. LEACH RE-
PORT (PART 2), supra note 3, at 122.
257 See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
258 Emert, supra note 242, at 11.
259 Id. at 12.
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multilateral netting ,agreements if the underlying gross obligations
are not extinguished until all netted obligations are performed.26 °
The most efficient way to handle this situation would be to
express recognition to netting arrangements through direct legisla-
tion or through authority granted to the regulatory bodies. When
recognized, netting arrangements should allow reduction of capi-
tal requirements.261 Similarly, clearinghouse arrangements should
allow capital reductions. Indeed, clearinghouse arrangements
should allow even more substantial capital reductions when they
are coupled with clearinghouse margin requirements. The posting
of margin on positions marked-to-market daily provides a very reli-
able method for assuring appropriate risk recognition. Clearing-
houses will reduce counterparty risk for both dealers and end
users.
26 2
260 Id. at 13. This still does not authorize clearinghouse arrangements. Id.
Regulators have generally expressed agreement with two Groups of Thirty recom-
mendations concerning quantification of market risk through probability analysis and
encouraging unlimited two-way payment for bilateral netting. LEACH REPORT, supra
note 3, at 53-54.
261 The Financial Times has noted that, in order to move swap dealers towards a
clearinghouse, there would have to be a requirement of regulatory capital, i.e., the
clearinghouse function would lessen any such capital requirements. Morse, supra
note 229, at VI.
262 In the meantime, net capital reductions could be given where the counterparty
has a triple AAA credit rating, a concept that is already employed to a limited extent
by the SEC's net capital rule. For example, non-convertible debt securities with a
fixed interest rate, rated in one of the four highest categories by at least two of the
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, are subject to specified haircuts
that range from two to nine percent, depending on their maturity. If these positions
are hedged by qualified nonconvertible debt securities or United States government
securities with matched maturity dates within specified periods, substantially reduced
deductions are allowed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (vi) (F) (1993). Non-convertible
zero coupon bonds may also qualify for these haircuts if other securities of the issuer
are not in default and the bonds are rated in one of the four highest categories by two
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. NYSE INTERPRETATION HAND-
BOOK, supra note 231, at 209. Additionally, debt securities issued pursuant to the Sec-
ondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act must be rated in one of the two highest
rating categories by one such organization in order to qualify for this treatment. Id. at
210. The use of the rating organizations, however, raises the question of the validity
of their ratings and whether the ratings organizations themselves need regulation in
view of the increasingly important role they are playing in counterparty risk assess-
ments. See Francis BottiniJr., Comment, An Examination of the Current Status of Ratings
Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 579-
620 (1993).
Moody's Investors Services has found that very few banks' credit ratings have
been affected by derivative activities except in a positive way. LEACH REPORT, supra
note 3, at 16. Standard and Poor's Corporation expressed similar views. Id. at 17.
But derivatives can have an effect on the credit rating of a derivative firm, For exam-
ple, Bankers Trust had its credit rating reviewed as a result of its derivative trading
activities. In 1993, Bankers Trust had earned $600 million from proprietary trading,
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VII. REGULATING THE END USER
End users must also confront counterparty and product risks.
The regulation of their activities, however, will vary from the regu-
lations applied to dealers. It is not practical to impose net capital
requirements on most end users. 63 Their businesses are simply
too diverse, and most firms would simply forgo the use of deriva-
tives in order to avoid such a regimen, even if the products were
otherwise economically useful. Nevertheless, the sometimes mas-
sive losses experienced by end users suggest that some regulation is
needed.2
Such regulation should rest lightly. The most critical require-
ment is that end users be required to recognize the risks they are
incurring through derivatives. Efforts in this direction are already
underway in requiring financial statements to disclose more about
the derivatives activities of firms. Going beyond that point is more
difficult.265
Government generally has no business telling private compa-
nies how to run their operations. If a company enters into an im-
provident enterprise, that is, for the most part, a matter for the
shareholders and not the government. Nevertheless, there is a
hook, at least in the case of publicly held companies. By law, share-
holders in a publicly held company are entitled to full disclosure
on material matters.266 This does not require disclosure of trade
secrets, but shareholders should be informed of such material mat-
ters as lack of adequate management controls for trading in deriva-
tives, material risks from such instruments, and related
information. In effect, this will force these companies to adapt ad-
equate controls and to monitor their exposure from derivatives ac-
but it lost $49 million from such trading in the first quarter of 1994. Hansell, supra
note 155, at Cl. On April 21, 1994, Bankers Trust also disclosed that some seventy
percent of its first-quarter profits came from derivative products. About $114 million
of the bank's first-quarter earnings came from derivative products. In 1993, about
thirty percent of its profits were from derivative products. Lipin & Stern, supra note
135, at A3; see also Lipin et al., supra note 135, at Al. Bankers Trust has also predicted
a slow down in derivative trading with the announcement of losses by some firms and
increased regulation. Richard Waters, U.S. Banks Sees Cut in Derivative Use, FIN. TIMES,
April 22, 1994, at 27.
263 Brokers and banks in the securities, banking and futures industry are subject to
net capital requirements, but their customers are not.
264 See supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text. See generally Taming the Treasurer,
THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 1994, at 15.
265 See supra note 210.
266 Indeed, this is the central thrust of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 and 15 U.S.C. § 78; Mutually Reassuring: Mutual Funds Should Tell Investors About
Why and How They Are Dabbling in Derivatives, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1994, at 22.
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tivities. 267 Fiduciaries and other institutions trading other people's
money may have similar obligations imposed by the "prudent man"
principle, by their particular regulators or the Courts. This may
leave out the hedge funds and other private institutions, but they
can probably fend for themselves.
Another useful tool would be a large trader reporting require-
ment.2 68 Such a requirement is not novel. The CFTC requires
these reports by traders in the futures markets.269 This tool would
267 A requirement that independent accountants assess the adequacy of derivative
internal controls could also be included here, as well as for derivative dealers. See
supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act re-
quires that publicly held companies maintain a system of internal accounting con-
trols. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). In 1978, the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities,
known as the Cohen Commission, recommended that the management of public
companies report to shareholders on internal accounting controls. A similar recom-
mendation was made in 1979 by a Special Advisory Committee to the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants. Exchange Act Release No. 16877 (June 6,
1980). The SEC, thereafter, proposed such a rule, but that proposal was withdrawn in
1980. Id.; Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Concerning Derivative Financial Instruments Before the Subcommittee On
Telecommunications and Finance Committee On Energy and Commerce United
States House of Representatives (May 25, 1994). Later, the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (known as the "Treadway" Commission) considered
needed improvements to the reporting requirements to publicly held companies, and
it recommended that:
All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their
annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by the chief
executive officer and the chief accounting officer and/or the chief fi-
nancial officer. The management report should acknowledge manage-
ment's responsibilities for the financial statements and internal
controls, discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide
management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal
controls.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 44 (Oct.
1987). In 1988, the SEC again proposed a rule that would have required manage-
ment report on internal controls. That proposal was -also withdrawn in 1992 after it
met stiff industry opposition. Exchange Act Release No. 33-6789 (July 26, 1988); Ex-
change Act Release No. 33-6935 (Apr. 24, 1992). See also Testimony of Arthur Levitt,
supra (describing this background). This issue needs to be revisited, at least for deriv-
ative transactions.
268 As one report noted:
The relative newness of this market activity, the fragmented regula-
tory responsibility, the global trading, and the competitive secrecy of
many transactions virtually precludes the possibility of getting a full pic-
ture of the derivatives market. Even a partial view is scarce: the Fed
does not publish the data it collects, but makes it available in electronic
form to interested parties; the SEC anticipates the weekly data in the
near future.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
269 Large traders must file forms with the CFTC disclosing background information
on the trader and its principals and must report large position changes daily. 17
C.F.R. §§ 15.00-21.03 (1993). See generally Jerry W. Markham & Kyra K. Bergin, The
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allow regulators to assess the positions of large traders for systemic
concerns, particularly where a large institution is dealing with sev-
eral dealers and pyramiding positions.2 70 The large trader report
will also require the institution to chart its trading activities. This
and a requirement that senior management sign-off on the report
should help assure better internal monitoring as well as accuracy in
the reports.
One thing that is not needed is a paternalistic approach to
institutional traders. They should not be subjected to the protec-
tions afforded to small investors under the federal securities laws.
They can themselves assess the risks and value of an investment.
This is not a responsibility that should be thrust on derivative deal-
ers unless specifically contracted for in writing. Unfortunately, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has concluded other-
wise. It has imposed a suitability requirement on banks dealing in
derivatives. 71 Heretofore, such a requirement has generally been
addressed only to the proverbial widows and orphans. 72 There
Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in International Commodity Transactions,
18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 581, 620-622 (1985) (description of the CFTC's
large trader reporting system).
CFTC large trader reports are now becoming mechanisms for speculators and
others to follow the market effects of large financial firms trading in the commodity
futures market. Suzanne McGee, Report Allows the Savvy to Track Funds' Moves, WALL
ST. J., May 2, 1994, at C1.
The SEC proposed the adoption of large trader reporting requirements after it
experienced difficulties in gathering trade information to analyze market breaks in
1987 and 1989. The SEC noted, in proposing these rules, that the growth of institu-
tional trading also necessitated additional information on the often large scale trad-
ing activities of the institutions. Exchange Act Release No. 34-29593 (Aug. 22, 1991).
Reports would be required for transactions of 200,000 shares with a fair market value
of $2,000,000 or more, for transactions with a fair market value of $10,000,000 or
more, and for transactions that constitute "program trading," i.e., index arbitrage or
basket trades valued at $1,000,000 or more. Exchange Act Release No. 34-33608 (Feb.
9, 1994). For a discussion of program trading and index arbitrage, see Markham &
Stephanz, supra note 62, at 2000-01.
The SEC is additionally seeking information from firms on their derivatives activi-
ties in order to further understand this market and to assess its potential dangers.
Berton, supra note 4, at Cl.
270 Pyramiding involves the use of profits from a leveraged speculative position to
increase the size of that position, resulting in further leveraging that may exceed the
prudential limits for the investor. See Jerry W. Markham, supra note 49, at 68. One
proposed bill would provide emergency reporting authority for regulators. 140
CONG. REC. H2202-01, H2203 (1994) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
271 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
272 The suitability rule requires broker-dealers in the securities industry to refrain
from making trading recommendations to customers that are not suitable for the
customers in light of that particular customer's financial circumstances and objec-
tives. The suitability rule stems from a New York Stock Exchange "know your cus-
tomer rule." The know your customer rule is actually is to protect the broker-dealer
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seems to be no reasoned basis for extending such a requirement to
protect institutions.
CONCLUSION
The losses experienced from derivatives and the growth and
size of the derivatives market may make further regulation almost
inevitable. Such regulation may be incremental in responding to
problems as they develop, which is not an altogether unacceptable
philosophy: "if it ain't broke don't fix it." That view, however, can
rightly be criticized as a "head in the sand" approach to a sizeable
danger to the financial system.
At the other end of the spectrum, exchange trading require-
ments and/or a special "Derivatives Regulatory Commission" may
be too intrusive, resulting in a strangling of this economically use-
ful, highly innovative, and still growing industry. A middle ground,
therefore, may be more appropriate. 273 Experience in the govern-
from customer defaults. The suitability rule, however, seeks to protect the customer.
Traditionally, the SEC's enforcement of suitability standards arose in cases involving
boiler room firms that were directing high pressure sales efforts toward unsophistica-
ted customers. NICHOLAS WOLFSON ET AL., REGULATION OF BROKER, DRALERS AND SE-
CURITIES MARKETS 2.08[2] (1977).
The CFTC and the courts have rejected a suitability requirement for futures bro-
kers. Instead, futures commission merchants are required to give customers a one
page warning statement that graphically sets forth the risks of trading futures. The
customer must make a written acknowledgement of their receipt and understanding
of that statement. JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULA-
TION & OTHER CLAIMS § 10.01-10.09 (1994); Markham & Bergin, supra note 5, at 1305-
09.
273 A managing director of Lehman Brothers, Thomas Russo, has proposed a
model for the regulation of derivative instruments that would require derivatives deal-
ers to adopt a code of conduct that would be carried out in "partnership" with the
federal government. Russo, supra note 150. Under the code of conduct, firms would
be required to have independent credit, internal audit, legal, compliance and
marked-to-market functions. Id. at 14-15. Russo also proposes that each firm would
have a new products committee that would be independent of the business section
itself, and they would review new products for risk management and business viability.
Russo would also require independent verification by a recognized accounting firm,
which is already required for AAA rated derivative subsidiaries. Id. at 15. Ethical in-
tegrity would also be stressed by Russo in recognizing errors and dealing with them.
Coordination of derivative trading with other parts of firms would be encouraged,
and upgraded systems would be used to assure effective risk management. Id. at 15-
16. Most importantly, Russo would adopt a risk capital model as a part of his pro-
posed code of conduct. He notes that the SEC's net capital approach is not appropri-
ate for derivatives because it addresses liquidity concerns while the derivatives
business "depends on credit concerns like a commercial bank." Id. at 17. Under
Russo's model the risk capital approach that would be applied to derivatives would
incorporate credit risk as well as market risk. Russo would allow netting of positions
and would assess the risk relative to a firm's portfolio. The rule would also be "subject
to stress tests for volatilities, basis risk and credit deterioration." Id. at 17. Russo addi-
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ment securities markets provides models for the regulation of de-
rivative instruments that do not include an exchange trading
requirement. They are not perfect comparisons, but the repo anal-
ogy seems appropriate. Indeed, repos are often identified as a
form of derivative transaction.274
The use of such a model will require registration of dealers
and assignment of responsibility for regulation to one or more reg-
ulators. They will have to develop substantive regulations, includ-
ing risk based net capital rules that will undoubtedly be complex.
End users may also need additional regulation in the form of large
trader reports, increased internal and accounting controls, and fi-
nancial disclosure.
tionally would require disclosure to counterparties to make sure they understand the
risks of transactions. Russo's model would apply to dealers and not to end-users. See
also Thomas Russo, Viewpoints, Let Wall St. Handle Derivatives Rules, N.Y. TIMFs, May 15,
1994, § 3, at 13; Thomas Russo, Partnering a Code of Good Business Practices, FUTURES
INDUSTRY, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 29-30. The Securities Industry Association has advo-
cated a similar approach. Letter To Brandon Becker, Director, Market Regulation
Division, Securities and Exchange Commission From Jeffrey L. Seltzer, Chairman
Swap & OTC Derivative Products Committee, Securities Industry Association (Apr. 7,
1994).
274 See supra notes 88-104.
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